Ohio Practical Business Law : Columbus Ohio Business Lawyer & Attorney : Teri Rasmussen : Plunkett Cooney Law Firm : Commercial Law, Creditors, Business Formation : Columbus, Central Ohio

Suppose a foreclosing lender had to come up with the CASH for EVERY deposit required in foreclosure sales in which it was the foreclosing plaintiff and successful bidder at sheriff's sale.  It shouldn’t take long to realize that we are talking about a MESS OF DOLLARS here.  Could that cause a cash flow issue and maybe slow down the pace of foreclosures?  Well maybe. 

About a year ago, Ohio made several significant changes to its foreclosure law.  Then and probably even more now, foreclosures (particularly of the residential variety) were widely being perceived as increasingly serious epidemic.  And so various foreclosure mediation programs were born, backlogs legitimately produced delays, and courts in some areas of the state started instituting procedures such as referring every single foreclosure case to a magistrate which promised to slow the entire process down considerably. 

Now from a lender standpoint, none of this was good news.  But apparently, in the view of some, this wasn’t enough.  And so, in some courts now – primarily in northeast Ohio which has been hit hardest, additional measures have been taken to make foreclosure a more difficult process for lenders. 

I mentioned the other day that I’d made a trip down to a Franklin County, Ohio sheriff’s sale in a pending foreclosure case I am handling for a client.  And part of the reason I went myself was that it involved bidding for a junior lienholder in a situation in which we were anticipating contested bidding. Which squarely raised the question: could I credit bid on behalf of this junior lienholder or was my client going to have to come up with the full amount of the deposit typically paid by third party purchasers?

Now, you think you know things… and then you find out that well, maybe, you don’t or at least the whole world isn’t the way you thought – and if you’re anything like me, that starts to concern you at least a wee little bit ‘cuz now you start to worry ‘bout what you CAN rely upon.  And what I learned this week was that while fortunately here in Franklin County, the world of foreclosures and sheriff’s sales was indeed precisely as I thought, it’s a “whole ‘nother ball game”  elsewhere in Ohio.  

Specifically what I found out was that the concept of “credit bidding” whereby a lienholder did not have to come out of pocket so long as the amount of its bid was no more than the amount owed it was not quite so universal a truth as I had heretofore believed.  Here in Franklin County and Central Ohio, sanity – from the lender perspective – reigns.  First lienholders needing or wishing to bid in a property brought to sheriff’s sale in a foreclosure proceeding need only bring a much smaller specified amount to successfully “bid in” property.  In addition, junior lienholder (such as my client) are also not required to pay more than this.

In Cuyahoga County (i.e. Cleveland), it’s a whole different story.  There, NO ONE is allowed to credit bid AT ALL.  Local Rule 27 governing foreclosure sales requires a 10% deposit (based on the appraised value of the property being offered) to be made by the successful bidder at sheriff’s sale.  It also states: 

When the purchaser is the lien holder after the lien of costs, taxes and assessments, the Court  may order, if the lien holder or assignee is the successful bidder at sale, that the required deposit be waived and thar all costs, taxes and assessmenof ts be paid upon receipt of a statement from the Sheriff of Cuyahoga County

However, the Foreclosure Terms of Sales available on the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s website make it absolutely clear that NO WAIVERS willl be granted, stating "There shall be no waiver of Deposit for any Sheriff Sale.".

A similar procedure has also been adopted in Erie County.   In Lucas County (i.e. Toledo), however, lienholders are only reqired to come up with $1000 plus the amount of real estate taxes due.  And in Montgomery County, Local Rule 2.23 permits credit bidding for first lienholders, but not for jumior lienholders,  So I suppose the practice point here is to be sure to check the local rules before showing up at a sheriff's sale. 

Why is this happening?    it arises from the interpretation of revised Ohio Rev. Code 2327.02 which provides in reelvant part:

 If the property is sold under an order of sale or transferred under an order to transfer, the officer who conducted the sale or made the transfer of the property shall collect the recording fee and any associated costs to cover the recording from the purchaser or transferee at the time of the sale or transfer and, following confirmation of the sale or transfer and the payment of the balance due on the purchase price of the property, shall execute and record the deed conveying title to the property to the purchaser or transferee. For purposes of recording that deed, by placement of a bid or making a statement of interest by any party ultimately awarded the property, the purchaser or transferee thereby appoints the officer who makes the sale or is charged with executing and delivering the deed as agent for that purchaser or transferee for the sole purpose of accepting delivery of the deed

Not certain the statute actually forbids credit bidding?  Well, neither am I. Now, rationally and logically, here is what I can see.  If counties want a deposit to be made to cover real estate taxes, well O.K. maybe I can see that.  However, beyond that, when it comes to the first lienholder, it doesn't even make sense to require additional payments into the Court,  It doesn’t make sense because the lienholder is PAYING ITSELF at this point!! 

For junior lienholders, I suppose I can see some logic here, but as a practical matter , it still makes very little sense.  Junior lienholders in one case are likely to be seniore lienholders in another case so it is unlikely that there will be any actual problem with payment of these amounts at the time the deed is ready.  And not infrequently, given the delays experienced in completing the foreclosure process, the successful lender bidder will have already assigned its bid and sold the property to a third party in any event , thus complicating the financial accoounting for these transactions.       

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This morning I went down to the weekly Franklin County Sheriff's Sale to bid on a property for a client.  I don't get down there for this sort of thing that much anymore - paralegals and clients themselves tend to take the duty - but it was interesting to see both what was the same and what had changed from when I was the designated attendee years ago.

In the "old days", i.e. more than 20 years ago, sheriff's sales in foreclosures really did happen on the courthouse steps in some places.  Here in Franklin County, Ohio, sheriff's sales in foreclosures were done in the lobby of the Common Pleas Courthouse by a burly looking guy standing behind an enormous wooden podium (which is actually still there) and wielding a gavel.  It was noisy and necessarily a tad uncomfortable because it was strictly a standing only event with no seats.  And there really was a bit of a sense of drama as folks milled around waiting for the sale to begin.  And the actual fall of the gavel was a nice touch too.

Today, Franklin County sheriff's sales in foreclosure cases take place in a large nice quiet carpeted auditorium/room on the first floor of the courthouse with plenty of seats for everyone.  Three women - substantially less intimidating than I remember the guy doing it years ago - run the sales from a podium on a stage raised about 6 feet at the front of the room.  Then there are about a dozen table desks, well spaced in 3 rows, for the "regulars" who attend the event every week and may be bidding on multiple properties.  And for the rest of us, a couple of rows of reasonably comfortable chairs set up behind the special desks.  It is obviously a far more sensible arrangement, but at least to me, it somehow just doesn't quite seem as "official"  -- although of course it is.

Promptly at 9 AM every Friday (the time and day for sheriff's sales vary from county to county), the foreclosure sales begin.  First, all of the properties being withdrawn from sale, mostly because of bankruptcy filings but also possibly because they have been brought current or for some other reason, are read in alphabetical order by debtor.  Then each property is called in turn, again alphabetically by the principal defendant owner.  (Other counties may use a different order.)  Since my case involved a debtor defendant whose name started with "W", I was there for quite a while... and began to really appreciate the progress represented by the provision of those chairs.

So what happens, exactly?  Each sale is announced in the same way:

• Big Bank v. Jones at 123 Columbus Street,
• [Case  No.] 08-XXXX,
• Attorney Rasmussen,
• Appraised $XXX,XXX,
• Deposit $XX,XXX [in Franklin County and many other  Ohio counties, this is at least 10% of the appraised value, although the plaintiff lender can require more], 
• Parcel No. XXX-XXX-XXXX

And then, a brief description mentioning the subdivision or other identifying information is mentioned, followed by the words: 

Commonly known as 123 Columbus Street.  I need an Opening Bid of $XXX,XXX [here in Ohio this would be two-thirds of the Appraised Amount]    

At this juncture, bidding is open to everyone in attendance.    Sheriff's sales are open to the public.  It is not necessary to be an attorney, or even a paralegal, to bid.  Nor do you even have to be a resident of Ohio.  You do not have to register in advance, or even on the day of the sale,  to attend or bid.  You do, however, have to be there in person.  Eventually, sheriff's sales may carch up with technology, but for now there's no bidding by telephone or on-line and no streaming video of the sales as they happen. 

For most properties, there's not much interest.  Sometimes even the foreclosing plaintiff lender doesn't bid.  In these cases, the words "No Bid, No Sale "are intoned and the property will be reappraised at a lower value and offered for sale some subsequent Friday.   If, as often happens, the plaintiff lender makes the opening bid at the required minimum amount (and ocasionally for a bit more) and everyone else sits on their hands, the representative of the Sheriff's office simply says "Sold to the Plaintiff for $XX".

In the relatively rare situation in which there actually is some interest in the property being offered at foreclosure sale, bidding begins at the minimum bid amount, frequently kicked of by the plaintiff lender, and it goes from there.  There is no "auctioneer" in the sense of someone rattling on trying to coax higher bids as you might see in an ordinary auction.  Rather interested bidders simply speak up and the Sheriff's representative repeats the amount and pauses to see if anyone else wishes to place a higher bid.    If bidding gets bogged down, certain minimum increments may be imposed, but for the most part, bidding increases in the amounts desired by those bidding.  When it appears that no one wishes to place a higher bid, the iconic words "Going once, going twice, sold to... " are spoken, bringing the sale to an end.

At this point , the successful bidder must bring his properly completed Real Estate Judicial Sale Purchaser information Form and a Cashier's Check (no personal or company checks permitted except for lienholders) in the amount of the required deposit to the front of the room and hand it to the Sheriff's representative.  THIS MUST HAPPEN IMMEDIATELY - there is no waiting for the successful bidder to "go out to their car"  or over to the nearest bank branch to get the check - IMMEDIATE means NOW and if the deposit check isn't forthcoming or the paperwork is otherwise not in order for some reason, the property will be immediately resold right then and there!  (That actually happened once today although I don't know exactly what was wrong.) 

And then it's over.  No gavel now...  they just move on to the next property.  It's then up to the plaintiff lender's attorney to prepare a Confirmation Order within 3O days naming the successful bidder and specifying how the proceeds of sale are to be distributed in accordance with the applicable priority of the various lienholders.  The sheriff's deed conveying the real estate to the successful bidder and new owner must be prepared within 7 days after entry of the Confirmation Order and submitted to the Sheriff's office.  Sometimes it can then take quite a while after that before the deed actually gets recorded.  Once the Confirmation Order is entered by the Common Pleas Court, there is NO EQUITY OF REDEMPTION allowing the defendant to regain possession of the real property and the sale is final.

For more information about how Sheriff's sales are conducted here in Franklin County, Ohio, visit  the Franklin County Sheriff's website and click the "Civil Real Estate Sales" button on the left hand side of the page.   You can also find lists of properties to be sold at upcoming foreclosure sales, as well as the results of recently completed sales here - the results from today's sale were up by lunchtime.  Because Ohio's foreclosure law has recently changed, it may also be worthwhile to review the informational WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW AS A POTENTIAL THIRD PARTY PURCHASER material made available there.

All in all, a fairly interesting Friday morning.

For another person's account of the experience, visit A Trip to the Franklin County Sheriff's Weekly Real Estate Auction.

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I'm finishing up my recent series of posts on cognovit notes and judgments with a summary of the key things to know about cognovit notes and judgments in Ohio.   

     1.  Shortcut to Judgment.  Cognovit notes provide a shortcut to judgment, allowing a creditor to take a judgment immediately (and I mean within MINUTES) of the filing of the Complaint.  No advance notice to the debtor required.  For more information on how this works, visit my Cognovit Promissory Notes Explained post.

     2.   Few States Allow.  Ohio is one of only a handful of states permitting cognovit judgmentsnat all. In fact, as far as I know, they are only enforceable in OHIO, Pennsylvaina, Maryland, Virginia and Delaware.  Visit An Examination of Confession of Judgment Statutes in the Mid-Atlantic States  for a very concise and specific summary of what is required in each of these states for a valid cognovit note.  In Indiana, it's even a Class B misdemeanor (punishable by a $1,000 fine or 180 days imprisonment)  to include cognovit language in a promissory note or to try to enforce a cog taken somewhere else like, say, Ohio. Indiana Code 34-54-4-1  

     3.  Commercial Deals ONLY.  Cognovit notes are valid ONLY in commercial transactions involving businesses and are not enforceable with respect to consumer obligations.   Ohio Rev. Code 2323(E).  

>>>>>>      The rest of these points pertain ONLY with respect to Ohio cogs.  

     4.   Follow the Statute.   DO NOT VARY IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTORY COGNOVIT WARNING.  The cognovit warning  should appear IMMEDIATELY (and I mean WITHOUT ANYTHING IN BETWEEN)  above(preferably) or below the signature line and should look EXACTLY like this for best results:

WARNING – BY SIGNING THIS PAPER YOU GIVE UP YOUR RIGHT TO NOTICE AND COURT TRIAL.  IF YOU DO NOT PAY ON TIME, A COURT JUDGMENT MAY BE TAKEN AGAINST YOU WITHOUT YOUR PRIOR KNOWLEDGE AND THE POWERS OF A COURT CAN BE USED TO COLLECT FROM YOU RGARDLESS OF ANY CLAIMS YOU MAY HAVE AGAINST THE CREDITOR WHETHER FOR RETURNED GOODS, FAULTY GOODS, FAILURE ON HIS PART TO COMPLY WITH THE AGREEMENT, OR ANY OTHER CAUSE.   

     5.  Confession of Judgment Must Also Be included.  Do not forget to include the enabling language authorizing confession of judgment within the body of the promissory note, guaranty or other instrument.  If the enabling language is not included, the instrument will still be enforceable but will not be any good for taking a cognovit judgment.  Klosterman v. Turnkey-Ohio, L.L.C., 2009-Ohio-2508 (10th App. Dist.).   The statute does not specify the exact language to be used, but over time certain language has customarily come to be used in virtually every Ohio commercial note or guaranty.

      6.  Enforceable Where Signed or Where Maker Located. Cognovit judgments must be taken in (A) the County in which the cognovit note was signed; OR (B) the County in which the individual resides or the business has its principal office.  Ohio Rev. Code 2323.13(A)

     7.   Not Required to Use Business Courts.  At least for now, the existence of commercial law dockets/business courts does not require cognovit judgments to be taken by a judge of that docket  GLIC Real Estate Holding, L.L.C. v. 2014 Baltimore-Reynoldsburg Road, L.L.C., 906 N.E.2d 517, 2009-Ohio-2129 (Common Pleas-Franklin Cty)

     8.  Signing Cog Doesn't Create Attorney-Client Relationship.  No attorney client relationship is established when an Ohio attorney signs a cognovit answer on behalf of a defendant.  It is simply a ministerial act and does not subject the attorney signing the answer to any claim of unethcialconduct..  Opinion 93-3 Ohio Supreme Court Board of Commisioners on Greivancxes and Discipline,  Dibenetto v. Miller, 180 Ohio App.3d 69, 2008-Ohio-6506 (1st App. Dist.).

     9. Copies May Do.  While many Ohio courts may require or at least expect the original promissory note containing the cognovit provision to be produced, the statute does permit use of a copy.  Ohio Rev. Code 2323.13(A).  Good luck with that one - call me when you're able to get the judgment without showing the original of the note to  the judge.

       10.    Getting a Do-Over.  It does not take as much to open up a cognovit judgment thorugh a Rule 60(B) motion as it does with rexpect to other judgments.  However, you have to at least show that a meritorious defense exists, at least in theory.  Visit my previous post What It Takes to Open Up a Cog Judgment to find out more details.

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When I hear the word "indulgences", my mind immediately goes to something "sinful" and well, probably fun.  In this case, however, I'm talking about  that ubiquitous provision found in loan documents designed to allow lenders to continue to hold borrowers and gurantors liabile notwithstanding the lender's failure or inability to abide by the letter of the loan documents or to exercise all or some subset of its rights upon default in a manner saitsfactory (usually with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight) to the borrower and/or gurantor.  Does this stuff really worK?   

Suppose you have this deliquent borrower -  let's call him "B"  -- on a promissory note (though it could be any obligation) and collateral not worth enough to pay you off in full.  But then you also have this guarantor -- let's call him "G".  Somewhere along the line one of your folks messed up in that "commercial reasonable sale" thing that's supposed to happen when you repossess and liquidate collateral.  Or maybe you let a financial covenant default here and there pass for the time being.  Or perhaps you just extended the maturity date or went interest only for B for a while.  Question is whether you're still OK because you can hold G - who does have assets - liable for the obligation.

Most, if not all, bankers and their counsel would say "yes" because both the UCC and our loan docs say we can.  Which is why  Huntington National Bank v. Wallace, 2009 WL 2023891 (N.D. Ohio 2009) -- now on appeal to the Sixth Circuit and the subject of my last post -- is an important case to watch. 

In a nutshell, the Bank had allowed advances to the Borrower to fund draws on letters of credit in excess of a  "maximum amount" specified in the loan documents and the Bank was pursuing one of the guarantors,  Bank took cognovit judgment and guarantor sought relief from judgment   Federal district court held that the indulgence clause was not sufficient to preclude relief from judgment.

Initially, as a lender-oriented attorney, the case concerned me. It seemed to suggest that lenders permitting any sort of modification -- other than the most vanilla extension of time sort --would now be accepting a substantially greater risk that such forbearance would relieve any guarantor not explicitly consenting from liability. In addition, the manner in which it brushed aside the waivers contained in the “indulgence” clause as inapplicable sent a cold shiver down my spine.   And the logic of the ruling would be applicable not just to cognovit notes, but really any sort of obligation.  So, taken as a whole, if upheld by the Sixth Circuit, the decision seemed likely to convince many lenders that it simply was not in their best interests to work with delinquent borrowers.

As I've thought about it more, however, I've begun to think this decision makes more sense and is less alarming than I had first surmised.  The decision in fact makes an important distinction between the nature and extent of the obligation intended by the parties to be guaranteed on the one hand and mistakes and errors made by the lender in enforcing the guaranty on the other.  In this particular case, the guaranty was never intended to be unlimited - there was a clearly stated unambiguous cap on the amount of credit to be extended to the borrower at particular times.  In continuing to permit advances to fund letter of credit draws, the Bank exceeded this previously agreed limitation on the amount for which the guarantor had accepted responsibility for seeing was paid.

When read closely, the language itself – and certainly the concept originally underlying inclusion of such a clause – is about the consequences of the Bank’s inaction or failure to take appropriate steps to ensure the obligation guaranteed could be satisfied from sources other than the guarantor. When viewed from this perspective, the decision leaves largely intact a lender’s ability to rely on indulgence clauses with respect to events and actions occurring during the course of a workout situation.  It is only a lender’s decision to continue extending credit to the borrower beyond an explicitly agreed–upon point that becomes a problem.

Granted, the ruling is still worrisome.  In asset-based lending, a lender may unknowingly extend credit beyond the “availability” permitted pursuant to a borrowing base calculation formula.  And in the Wallace case, the Bank was obligated to honor letters of credit previously issued and really did not have the ability to refuse to make further advances.

What also makes things a bit problematic for me in this case is that the “cap” in question was only for a very short, almost temporary, period of time and was substantially less than it was at other times.  Had the events occurred but a couple of months earlier or later, the cap would not have come into play.

For me, the take-away lessons for now from this case are:

•  If at all possible, obtain guarantor consent to any modifications or waivers at the time the modifications are made or waivers given.  I already do this anyway, but now it will be even more important.
•  If a lender wants the guaranty to truly be unlimited and/or cover over-advances, the guaranty should say so very explicitly.
• Problems arising due to lack of perfection, release of collateral or other obligors, or other events and circumstances connected with an aspect of the lending relationship that do not pertain to the amount advanced are probably still within the protection of indulgence clauses.   

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How would Peanuts’ Linus manage without his trusty security blanket? Depending on the result, the Sixth Circuit reaches in a recently appealed cognovit judgment case, financial institutions such as banks and others relying on cognovit notes, and perhaps ordinary promissory notes as well, may well have to face a similar question.

Every guaranty I’ve seen has some variation of what is sometimes called an “indulgence” clause. These provisions essentially say that a guaranty remains in effect even if the Bank waives a default by the primary obligor or errs in its collection efforts. Now a federal district court, applying Ohio law, has snatched this security blanket away, saying that such a clause does not allow the lender to ignore the credit terms of a loan with impunity. 

In Huntington National Bank v. Wallace, 2009 WL 2023891 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (Case No.09CV408, Carr, J.), decided August 19, 2009, the defendant guarantor alleged he had a meritorious defense justifying vacation of the cognovit judgment taken against him. His argument was that because the Bank made a “material alteration” to the terms of his guaranty by continuing to allow advances even though the amount outstanding exceeded the prescribed “maximum amount”, his guaranty obligation was rendered invalid. 

The Bank has now appealed the case to the Sixth Circuit (Case No. 09-4172).  If upheld, the decision may have far reaching consequences beyond cognovit notes.  The district court decision suggests that the ONLY modification to an obligation that a lender may comfortably do is an extension of time unless the guarantor agrees.  It could also be taken as meaning that even if the guarntor consents, such modifications would release the guarantor of all liability

Factual Background

The underlying fact scenario is a common one. In August 2007, a company known as Bellepointe entered into a First Amended and Restated Loan and Security Agreement “Loan Agreement”) with the Bank. The Loan Agreement governed three separate obligations – a term note, a line of credit, and a “Guidance Line” involving draws on letters of credit. Michael Wallace (“Wallace”), the father of the company’s owner, executed a guaranty of Bellepointe’s indebtedness to the Bank; the son also executed a guaranty, but the case pertains only to the father’s guaranty.

The guaranty excluded any liability for the term loan indebtedness and also capped the maximum amount of liability with respect to the Line of Credit. The crux of the case focused on the proper interpretation of certain language found in the Loan Agreement and the Guidance Line cognovit note, to wit: 

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, the maximum amount available under the Guidance Line shall be as follows:

from the date hereof through and including 11/30/07 - $865,000

12/1/07 through and including 12/31/07 - $250,000

1/1/08 and thereafter - $550,000      

These provisions obviously required a substantial reduction in the amount outstanding as of December 1, 2007. It is not altogether uncommon for lines of credit to require a substantial reduction in the amount outstanding at least once a year. 

Procedural History

Procedurally, the case is a bit complicated. Apparently there was some discussion back and forth between Wallace and the Bank concerning his liability prior to any lawsuit being filed. When those talks broke down, Wallace filed a declaratory judgment action in the Southern District of Ohio federal district court against the Bank on February 11, 2009. Two days later, the Bank took a cognovit judgment against Wallace in Lucas County Common Pleas Court. The Bank said it had no knowledge of the declaratory judgment action when it took the cognovit judgment. 

Wallace promptly removed the state court cognovit judgment action to federal district court for the Northern District of Ohio, apparently on diversity grounds that he was a resident of Florida, and sought relief from judgment. After the Northern District federal court granted the motion to vacate the cognovit judgment, the Bank appealed to the Sixth Circuit where the case is now pending. It appears likely that the Southern District declaratory judgment action will be consolidated with the pending Northern District cognovit action.

The Decision 

Wallace alleged that the Bank continued to make advances on the Guidance Line in December 2007 even though Bellepointe had failed to reduce the amount outstanding as required.  Consequently, he contended that the Bank’s actions caused a “material alteration” in the nature of his guaranty obligation, thereby relieving him of liability under his guaranty. The Bank did not dispute that the advannces exceeded the "maximum amount."  However,it countered by pointing out that its loan documents had one of those “indulgence clauses” which stated:

Guarantor hereby promises that if one or more of the Obligations are not paid promptly when due, he will pay the Obligations to Bank, irrespective of any action or lack of action on the Bank's part in connection with the acquisition, perfection, possession, enforcement or disposition of any or all Obligations....   Guarantor agrees that no extension of time, whether one or more, nor any other indulgence granted to [sic] Bank by [sic] Debtor, or to any other gurantor, or any of them, and no omission or delay on Bank's part in exercising the right against, or in taking any action to collect from or pursue Bank's remedies against Debtor or any other guarantor, or any of them, will release, discharge or modify the duties of guarantor hereunder.

In addition, the Bank insisted that it was obligated to pay the draws on outstanding letters of credit in any event and that the definition of “advances” used in the line of credit differed from the definition of “maximum amount available” for precisely this reason. It also argued that the “indulgence” provisions in Wallace’s guaranty allowed it to ignore Bellepointe’s default in any event.  

So what happened? The federal district court agreed that the provisions of the loan documents did allow the Bank to continue making advances in December 2007. However, the court also noted that “Wallace’s burden is only to allege a meritorious defense, not to prove that he will prevail.” It went on to say:

Even if Wallace had initially failed to allege sufficient facts to support his defense, he has subsequently submitted an affidavit describing the above referenced facts, Wallace alleged sufficient facts for this court to evaluate whether his defense is meritorious.

And the reason? The Court cited Toland v. Key Bank of Wyoming, 847 P.2d 540 (1993) and Frost National Bank v. Burge, 29 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. App. 2000) for the proposition that “’indulgence’ is limited to extensions of time for payment and contract terms permitting indulgences do not waive suretyship defenses.” That’s it!  Really isn’t any further analysis or discussion. 

What IS interesting and informative are the briefs of the parties filed in the federal distriuct court case.  Leaving out exhibits, but including affidavits,here they are:

• Wallace's Motion to Vacate
• Bank's Responsive Memo in Opposition
• Wallace's Reply
• Bank's Sur-reply

Now I think the district court got this wrong and I’d really have appreciated a little further analysis of the pertinent provisions in the loan documents so I could fully understand the Court’s reasoning.  However, I also think the Sixth Circuit proceedings will be rather interesting to follow in the months ahead for lender attorneys everywhere. I’ll share my thoughts about the decision in more detail in my next post. 

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As a footnote to my last couple (click here and here) of posts about the Ohio foreclosure process, I thought it would be worthwhile to link to this recent post on "Evicting the Blameless Tenant"  by Mark Edwards of the Concurring Opinions blog which, especially for a legal blog post, has drawn substantial vociferous comments.  (Hat tip to the Tough Times for Lenders blog for their aptly titled "The Very Dark Side: Evicting tenants from foreclosed apartments" for drawing my attention to this post and pointing up the dichotomy between the lender/servicer view of apartment investment real estate as "project collateral" and the owner/investor (and certainly the tenant) perspective of an "apartment community").

This extremely well written post  poses the question of who as between a lender and a tenant should bear the risk of foreclosure.  It begins:

One of the most pernicious effects of the mortgage crisis has been the eviction of blameless tenants. Leases are usually terminated by foreclosure. Tenants who have never missed a rent payment, and who have no idea that their landlord has not been applying rent payments to their mortgage obligations, suddenly face eviction -- often with no notice.

 

It is difficult to overstate the trauma of the eviction. Tenants are not only turned out into the streets. Often their personal property is put on the curb or thrown into dumpsters. They don't just lose their homes -- they can lose everything they own. Passing rainstorms or scavengers can turn a lifetime's worth of work into nothing. Children in particular can be traumitized by seeing parents rendered powerless, by losing their possessions, and by the fear of the unknown. Violence is a constant threat.

While it is hard not to be moved by these words, it remains difficult for me to be believe that lenders routinely make the effort to boot out truly "blameless" tenants.   Although I can certainly conceive of situations in which tenants have dutifully paid their rent to an unscrupulous landlord who has filed to make mortgage payments, thus resulting in a foreclosure. it remains difficult for me to believe that the truly "blameless" tenant, whether residential or commercial, is all that frequently in danger of being thrown out on the street without warning.  For one thing, at least in Ohio, they would need to be named as defendants in the foreclosure for their rights to be definitively cut off.  

If the tenant is willing and able to continue paying rent at something close to a market rate, I just can't imagine that any purchaser in their right mind would want to disturb such a scenario.  In my experience, low vacancy properties with paying tenants are precisely the sort of commercial real estate valued most highly.  Why?  Because it's a turnkey operation and all the new owner has to do is notify the tenant(s) of a new address to which rent checks should be sent.  Why would any rational purchaser want to dump perfectly good tenants in favor of having to expend resources of time and money to go out and find others?

What I suspect is more likely the case is a situation in which the tenant has perhaps been a bit lax in consistently making timely rent payments - perhaps not so much deliquent that the property owner would be inclined to go to the trouble to get the tenant out, but enough to adversely affect the value of the property as a commercial investment.  In this scenario, it is not the "pure as the driven snow"  tenant we all feel for that we are really talking about.  

And now we are really back to the central issue in the larger foreclosure crisis - what to do about people who can no longer afford to remain in their homes and whether it matters whether we think they are at fault for allowing themselves to be in this situation.  Edwards (correctly in my view) recognizes that '[f]or the bank, the risk is that it is saddled with the responsibility of property management, and that it might be more difficult to sell the property".  He goes on to contend that the relative harm to the tenant of possible eviction and loss of personal property is higher and that

the absolute harm to society in general is greater [than the harm to the lender] when blameless tenants are evicted because of foreclosure, because eviction of blameless tenants has significant negative externalities for neighborhoods and cities. 

A number of the comments to the post (which are themselves interesting to read) seem to elicit an unusual amount of passion. and appear preccupied with allocating the moral supeiority high ground between the lender and tenant.  One more cogent comment by Nate Oman made the most sense to me and reflects my own questions as I read the post:

I am curious as to the underlying economics of these foreclosures. I can understand why the banks don't want to go into the property management business, but I don't see why avoiding that business requires evicting the tenants. Why can't the banks simply sell the properties along with the leases, which if the tenants really are blameless are a valuable income stream after all?

 

It seems to me that there are two possible issues. First, banks can't sell occupied property. Second, the leases lock in rental rates that no longer pay for the landlord. Niether of these seem intuitively plausible to me. The first possiblity is certainly belied by the routine sale of occupied commercial real estate. The second seems odd to me as well. If rent was somehow tied to the land lord's costs, then we would expect leases written at the height of the bubble to actually have very attractive terms given the current real estate market.

 

In short, I am confused as to exactly why this is happening. I suspect that there is some important part of the story that we are missing, and I'd like to understand what it is before signing off on any particular policy response.

While I certainly agree that commercial foreclosures could result in "collateral damage" to those actually living in the foreclosed property and that the"human element" of displaced residents raises issues that need to be addressed, I see these as social issues to be dealt with in a larger context.   Simply saying that because the lender has deeper pockets, it should have to deal with the problem (and in essence maintain the status quo of allowing continued occupancy of an apartment complex without regard to whether market rate rate is being paid by the third-party tenant)  seems too superficial (and frankly unfair) a solution to the issue. 

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The Cleveland foreclosure cases recently dismissed by Judge Boyko and Judge O'Malley have been incorrectly heralded by some as a severe blow to lenders wishing to foreclose on delinquent loans. At most, the decisions are merely a warning to a certain class of lenders involved in "securitization" transactions that they will need to pay more attention to certain details in those transactions, particularly if they wish to avail themselves of the federal courts in Northern Ohio.

It may have started with this post from I am Facing Foreclosure.com, but it was the New York Times story by Gretchen Morgensen which increased the level of interest in the dismissals of more than thirty foreclosure cases by two federal judges in Cleveland, Ohio. This then produced a bevy of activity in the blogosphere as others rushed in to express how exciting this was for borrowers. Click here and here for a sample of the reaction.

Now that Judge Rose, another federal judge in Dayton, Ohio has dismissed fourteen other similar cases and this has now also been reported by Gretchen Morgensen in the New York Times, some pundits will undoubtedly become even more effusive about this "victory" for homeowners facing foreclosure. For a copy of Judge Rose's Order, click JudgeRoseOrder.

However, those believing that these federal trial court dismissals without prejudice have somehow signaled disaster for lenders everywhere and a debt holiday for borrowers are sadly mistaken. To be sure, there have been some responsible bloggers who have tried to stem the tide against premature celebration. For example Calculated Risk has made at least two reasoned and exceptionally well explained posts about what this is all really about. Click here and here to read these - and if you read nothing else about these cases, read this! In addition, John Waller of the Indiana Commercial Foreclosure Blog has rather succinctly summed up what these cases mean in reality for lenders:

The moral of the story is that the institution filing the foreclosure suit, if pressed by the Court or the defendant borrower, must have proof that it owned the note and held the mortgage on the date of the filing of the foreclosure complaint. As demonstrated by the Ohio ruling, with respect to mortgage security pools this seemingly simple requirement may be burdensome or perhaps even impossible under certain structuring.

Corrective action probably can be taken during the proceedings in most cases to ensure that the named plaintiff actually holds the mortgage and owns the note. For example, depending upon the circumstances, the pleadings can be amended to name the proper party or, on the other hand, assignments can be executed to place the note/mortgage into the hands of the plaintiff. Lenders/investors and their counsel should be advised of the Ohio ruling and prepare themselves accordingly.

At the outset, it is important to understand how limited the dismissal ruling really is. All of the cases were dismissed "without prejudice" which means that once the deficiencies noted by the Judges are corrected (which they probably can be), the lenders can, and almost certainly will, refile the foreclosure successfully. In addition, unlike most foreclosures that are typically filed in state court, these dismissals occurred in cases filed in federal courts and there is no way to know whether state courts would require the same proof of the ownership of notes and mortgages. Finally, these were decisions made by trial courts which leaves other trial courts free to make other decisions.

So why were the cases dismissed? Simply put, the lenders failed to take sufficient care in establishing the chain of ownership through the various assignments of the mortgage and promissory note from one financial institution to another. The nature of the "securitization" process as applied to the mortgages in question certainly contributed to this shortcoming by making it more cumbersome to obtain all of the proper assignments throught the chain of title.

However, as explained in the Calculated Risk postings, with some expenditure of time and money, the problem can be remedied in these cases and relatively minor changes in procedures can totally eliminate the issue. Moreover, in those cases where the promissory note and mortgage have only been assigned once or twice and are not part of a mortgage-backed securitization, the problem of demostrating ownership is unlikely to arise anyway.

Thus, while these developments certainly underscore the importance of attention to detail, they in no way indicate any collapse of the securitization market or an insurmouintable problem for lenders. For another bank attorney's similar conclusion focusing on the practical realities of the situation, read Kevin Funnell's "Tale of Two Judges" posting on his Bank Lawyer's Blog.

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