We're Not in Kansas Anymore - Personal Jurisdiction and Getting Sued Far From Home Base

Now that pretty much anyone can set up a web-based business, even the smallest business can, and probably will, have customers in states other than that company's home base.  In addition to having to worry about when there's enough interaction with customers in a state to mean your business really needs to register with the Secretary of State as a "foreign" entity, there's always the possibility of being sued in some distant state by an unhappy customer/client.

Maybe you thought they'd have to come to Ohio to file a lawsuit against you.  Wrong.  Courts routinely can and do "exercise jurisdiction" over nonresident defendants they deem to have had sufficient connection with the states and its residents that it is not unfair to require them to defend an action in that State.  Thus, If a court decides your company has "minimum contacts" with the particular state your unhappy customer chose to file a lawsuit in, that state is where you have to go to defend the legal action, even if it's a long way from home for you.  See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)

It all starts with the state's "long arm" (yes, that IS what it's really called) jurisdiction statute.  Ohio's long arm statute is found in Ohio Rev. Code 2307.382.  Among other circumstances justifying the exercise of jurisdiction  over a defendant in a state far from its home base is "transacting any business in the state."  Ohio courts, as do courts in many other states, interpret "transacting business" rather broadly.  The Ohio Supreme Court has explained that it includes "to prosecute negotiations, to carry on business, to have dealings... carrying on of prosecution of business negotiations which have been either wholly or partly brought to a conclusion."  Kentucky Oaks Mail Co. v. Mitchell's Formal Wear, Inc., 52 Ohio St.3d 73 (1990).

Essentially, the test is whether the defendant has "purposefully availed” itself of a forum state when he has “deliberately engaged in significant activities within [the] state or created continuing obligations between himself and residents of the forum state,”   Richer v. Fraza/Forklifts of Detroit, 828 N.E.2D 205, 168 Ohio App.3d. 634, 2005-Ohio-1945 (10th App. Dist – Franklin Cty), or has otherwise “reach[ed] out beyond one state and create[d] continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state.” Calphalon Corp. v. Rowlette, 228 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2000)..

Courts are still wrestling with the sorts of websites and internet activity which can subject a business to jurisdiction and the possibility of a lawsuit in any given forum outside the state of the company’s formation. Courts remain divided about what the appropriate analytical framework should be and how the internet/web fits within the traditional “minimum contacts” paradigm of analysis. Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized the Internet as “a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication,” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997), it has yet to provide any specific guidance on how the concept of jurisdiction should be applied to web-based businesses. In addition, other courts have shown a reluctance to endorse any new theories of jurisdiction applicable only to the internet. See, e.g., GTE Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[w] e do not believe that the advent of advanced technology, say, as with the Internet, should vitiate long-held and inviolate principles of federal court jurisdiction.”).

Generally two main standards are used by courts to determine whether jurisdiction over a particular defendant is appropriate in cases involving the web.  Most courts seem to increasingly prefer the “sliding scale” test enunciated in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp.1119 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The major alternative is the “effects” test set forth in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). Courts sometimes use both to reach a decision. See Bailey v. Turbine Design, Inc., 86 F. Supp.2d 790 (W.D. Tenn. 2000). The Sixth Circuit has adopted the sliding scale test. Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc. 282 F.3 883 (6th Cir. 2002).  In both cases, the less interactive the website, the less likely a court is to exercise jurisdiciton.

Sliding Scale. The sliding scale test for determining jurisdiction is largely based on the nature of the website involved.  As set forth in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp.1119 (E.D. Pa. 1997), jurisdiction depends on extent of internet use and depends upon “level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.”   The Court explained:

At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the internet, then personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an internet website which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive website that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by interactive websites where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the website.

Effects Test     The other major test for determining whether the court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is known as the “effects” test”. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). Under this analysis the question is whether the nonresident defendant has purposefully caused “negative effects” to happen in the forum state. It is especially popular in defamation, trademark infringement, and other intentional tort cases.

Recently,in Kauffman Racing Equipment, LLC v. Roberts, 2010-Ohio-2251,  the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the jurisdiction issue in the context of alleged defamatory statements made in various internet postings.  The Court held that it did indeed have personal jurisdiction over the alleged internet defamer, saying  "We decline to allow a nonresident defendant to take advantage of the conveniences that modern technology affords and simultaneously be shielded from the consequences of his intentionally tortious conduct."  The opinion contains an excellent discussion of the jurisdiction concept. 

The Court's Office of Public Information's summary is useful for those not wanting to read the relatively lengthy opinion.  At least one commentator - whose concise analysis of the case is very helpful - believes that the case expands the jurisdiction of Ohio courts when it comes to stuff posted on the internet.  See this analysis as well 

I will be speaking on this and other "Advanced Issues in Business Entity Selection" topics on August 16, 2010 at NBI's seminar entitled LLC or Inc.?  Entity Selection for the Small to Medium Sized Business.  For more information or to register and attend, click this link

Chrysler Meets Bankruptcy - The Reality Show... And We're Just Getting Started!

So it's been SIX whole days (counting the Petition Date) now that Chrysler LLC has been in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, there's been two hearings before the bankruptcy judge, and even Chrysler isn't claiming anything of any true lasting importance has been determined so far.  Its latest press release  spills as much ink describing the company as it does trumpheting the  interim approval  by the Bankruptcy Court of DIP (aka debtor-in-possession) financing and permission to use "cash collateral" (i.e. proceeds from collection of accounts receivable and disposition of other collateral)  And as bankruptcy insiders know, if you don't get these pretty quick after you file, the case will soon be DOA.    

Center Stage - The 363 Motion

The 363 Sale Motion, a 250 page submission in total, was  filed the evening of Sunday, May 2.  For an excellent concise summary of the contemplated timeline (surprise!! it's more than two weeks!) and transactions encompassed in the proposed sale, visit "Chrysler Seeks  the ultimate 363 Sale as the Treasury Department Dictates the Pace" posted by Stephen Sathers at his A Texas Bankruptcy Lawyer's Blog

Even the Motion's title sounds like there's a lot to do.  Leaving off the begining part referencing a bunch of Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules, the Motion indicates that it seeks

(i) AN ORDER (A) APPROVING BIDDING PROCEDURES AND BIDDER PROTECTIONS FOR THE SALE OF ALL OF THE DEBTORS' ASSETS AND (B) SCHEDULING A FINAL SALE HEARING  AND APPROVING THE FORM AND MANNER OF NOTICE THEREOF; AND (II) AN ORDER (A) AUTHORIZING THE SALE OF SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE DEBTOR'S' ASSETS, FREE AND CLEAR OF LIENS, CLAIMS, INTERESTS AND ENCUMBRANCES, (b) AUTHORIZING THE ASSUMPTION AND ASSIGNMENT OF CERTAIN EXECUTORY CONTRACTS AND UNEXPIRED LEASES IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AND RELATED PROCEDURES, AND (C) GRANTING CERTAIN RELATED RELIEF  

  • The Summary of the transaction (well, really transactionS, plural), found beginning at the bottom of page 25, is 6 1/2 pages alone.
  • The Motion itself is 52 pages
  • The Purchase Agreement, attached as an exhibit, is nearly 100 pages long, even excluding the multiple signature pages, and that  DOES NOT include any exhibits to the Purchase Agreement
  • The proposed Bidding Procedure Order is more than 25 pages, not counting various forms of proposed notices
  • And then there's the additional 35-page supporting Memorandum of Law 

And Trying to Steal the Scene, the Objections....

>>>>>  so with all that, it's probably not too surprising that a few Objections to the proposed sale and otherwise have been filed.  Many fall back on the old chestnuts that bankruptcy lawyers always bring out in these situations and which to me seem particularly apt for the current circumstances - namely:

  • due process requires that we be given more time to figure out what's been proposed and figure out whether we like it and if not, why 
    • things are just moving too fast
    • we're going to need more time to get organized here
  • the debtor has stacked the proposed bidding procedures to favor the initial "stalking horse" , thereby making it exceedingly and unreasonably difficult for anyone else to participate

The Biggie by the NonTARP LendersThe earliest and most interesting  (in the sense that this is one to watch) objection to the bidding procedures and proposed 363 sale are the pleadings filed by a group calling itself the Non-TARP Lenders  (would that be a good name for a band?  I'm thinking that just "TARP Lenders" sounds like it has more promise).  These include  the initial "preliminary" objection filed May 4, followed by a "First Supplemental" objection filed today.  in addition to making the sort of objections referenced above  - which i really do think have lots of merit in this case -- the objections also contend that because of the number and complexity of actions and transactions involved, Chrysler is impermissibly trying to get what is really a "disguised" 'sub rosa plan of reorganization approved . 

This is an important objection and basically complains that Chrysler is trying to do a comprehensive plan of reorganization without complying with the procedures and protections for creditors which would usually accompany that process.  And while it's not specifically mentioned, that absolutely WOULD slow things down given that there are statutory minimum 25 day periods for circulation of a "Disclosure Statement" as well as mandatory hearings that would almost certainly be fierce brawls.  WATCH THIS ISSUE as a ruling on it could completely transform the Chapter 11 process for even the most humble and ordinary Chapter 11 out here in the fly-over states those of us who live here call the Midwest.

Other Objections to Sale.  There are also some objections by vendors (click here for one of them) focusing on on the part of the propsed sale where supply contracts with them are to be sold to Fiat or whoever the successful purchaser is.  According to these objections, the new purchaser would have up to 90 days to decide whether to assume of reject the contract, but the supplier would still be obligated to deliver goods during this period.  There's also one by Plast-o-Foam whcih appears to deal with reclamation claims with respect to goods recently supplied to Chrysler, but not paid for. 

Objections Apropo  of Nothing.  Then there's a new objection today by Chrysler Financial Services Americas LLC regarding the part of the deal where Chrysler wants to enter into a financing arrangement with GMAC Master Financial Services.  According to the Objection, Debtor Chrysler won't show them the Term Sheet even thought they would be directly affected.  Sounds like the sort of thing any sensible debtor would not want to be distracted by.

And now, quite literally in the last hour or so while I've been writing this post, a Motion for Adequate Protection by CSX Transportation , Inc., a rail carrier concerned about its status, has been filed   The Motion seeks adequate protection for its "common carrier" lien which it alleges can prime security interests.

>>>>>>>  These are only the highlights in the last couple of days.  And, really, the bankruptcy process and players aren't  even warmed up yet.  Everyone's in for a heckuva a rollercoaster of a ride!