Potato, Potahto, Illegal, Unlawful - Dombroski and New Rules for Piercing the Corporate Veil

The recent Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Inc., 2008-Ohio-4827, has only further complicated the determination whether the corporate veil should be pierced in particular cases.  In holding that the second prong of the seminal Belvedere test did not include merely unjust or inequitable acts, but did include "similarly unlawful" acts, the Court did nothing to clarify the circumstances in which corporate veil piercing is appropriate.

I've posted before about Ohio law on piercing the corporate veil, as well as the legal and factual context in which the Dombroski case arises.  In a nutshell, the plaintiff alleged bad faith against an insurance company for denying her medical claim.  She also sought to hold the insurer's parent company liable on a piercing the corporate veil theory.  Because the case had gone up on appeal on the granting of a 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court assumed that the parent company did in fact control the wholly owned insurance company to such a degree that it had no separate mind, will or existence of its own, thereby satisfying the first prong of Belvedere. 

The issue certified for appeal was:

Does the second prong of [the test for piercing the corporate veil set forth in Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners' Assn. v. R.E. Roark Co., Inc. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 274, 617 N.E.2d 1075], which states that the corporate veil can be pierced when control of the corporation "was exercised in such a manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act against the person seeking to disregard the corporate entity" also allow the corporate veil to be pierced in cases where control was exercised to commit unjust or inequitable acts that do not rise to the level of fraud or an illegal act?

In answering the question in a 6-1 decision (click here for Office of Public Information summary), the Court responded equivocally, rejecting the most liberal interpretation of the second Bevedere prong, but nevertheless adding additional verbage to the standard:

In view of the reality that shareholders could seriously misuse the corporate form and evade personal liability under the second prong as presentlyworded, we find it necessary to modify the second prong of the Belvedere test to allow for piercing in the event that egregious wrongs are committed by shareholders....

to fulfill the second prong of the Belvedere test for piercing the corporate veil, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant shareholder exercised control over the corporation in such a manner as to commit fraud, an illegal act, or a similarly unlawful act.  Courts should apply this limited expansion cautiously toward the goal of piercing the corporate veil only in instances of extreme misconduct. (emphasis supplied)

The Court appears to want to choose a middle ground between the interpretations favored by the Courts of Appeal below.  While this conceptually may have been the proper determination, the result seems a bit clumsy and to have added nothing but further confusion.  I agree with the dissent of Justice Pfeifer when he concludes the Court has "muddied the waters" and adds:

The new language seems to be pulled from the air.  Is there a notable distinction between an"unlawful" and an "illegal" act?  Not that the majority identifies.  the words appear to be two ways of saying the same thing.  Potato, potahto, illegal, unlawful - let's call the whole thing off.

Based on the oral arguments in this case, I had hoped for much more from this decision. 

Cubs Cursed by the "Business Judgment Rule"?

Pinch me - the Chicago Cubs REALLY are in the post-season and .... let's all hold our breath....  might even manage to make it to the World Series for the first time since 1945 and after precisely 100 years, could, just maybe, break the billy goat/black cat curse and win the World Series! . 

Of course, most or all of these games will be played at night.  And it was twenty years ago today,,, well almost (August 8, 1988 to be precise)... that lights came to Wrigley Field.  So I thought it might be a good time to revsit the part of the story about events along the way to Wrigley Field FINALLY getting lights, years after every other Major League baseball team.  Especially since the part I want to explore involves an unsuccessful effort to get night baseball at Wrigley and illustrates one way to apply the "business judgment rule" I've just been teaching to my Capital University students.  And the irony of talking about getting electric lights just after power has finally been restored to me after doing without for five days due to the incredible windstorm from Ike's remnants which whipped through Central Ohio last Sunday also seems oddly appropriate. 

Young Lawyer Takes on Mr. Wrigley.  I am of course talking about the celebrated case of Shlensky v. Wrigley et al., 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968).  In this case, William Shlensky was a minority shareholder of Chicago National League Baseball Cub (inc.) ("Cubs Corporation"), the corporation which owned the Chicago Cubs and operated Wrigley Field.  After several years of disappointing  financial results, Shlensky became convinced that this trend would continue unless the Cubs "got with the program" and installed lights to play night baseball - just like every single other Major League team had been doing for years.  For the short version of the essence of the case, check out this limerick from ContractsProf Blog:  

As Wrigley explained to the court,

Pro-ball is a daytime sport,

Night ball you can see

Down at Comiskey

Where the teams out for profit cavort.

So Shlensky, being a red-blooded American sued majority controlling shareholder Phillip K. Wrigley (who held 80% of the shares and was also President) in his capacity as a director of the  Cubs Corporation,as well as other directors and the Cubs Corporation itself.  The suit was a shareholder derivative action against the directors for negligence and mismanagement. and sought an order requiring the installation of lights at Wrigley Field.  Shlensky argued:

  • While the weekend attendance of the White Sox and the Cubs was about the same, weekday attendance at night games played by the White Sox was much higher than that of the Cubs.
  • Installation of lights is readily able to get financing and will quickly pay for itself through anticipated greater attendance.
  • Wrigley was refusing to install lights not because of any concern for the welfare of the Cubs Corporation, but rather because he believed that baseball is inherently a "daytime sport."
  • The other directors allowed Wrigley to dominate the board and acquiesed in the refusal to install lights even though they knew he wasn't acting in a good faith concern for the best interests of Cubs Corporation, but rather out of an entrenched personal opinion.

Business Judgment Rule in Action.  Shlensky contended that these facts demonstrated arbitrary and capricious acts on the part of the directors constituting negligence on their part in failing to exercise reasonable care and prudence in the mangement of corporate affairs of Cubs Corporation.  The trial court was not impressed and dismissed the amended Complaint apparently rather summarily without permitting any testiimony.

On appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that it had no business second-guessing the Cubs Corporation's board of directors.  After discussing the essence of the "business judgment rule", including another well known "business judgment rule" case involving Henry Ford and his fight with the Dodge brothers (Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 608 (1909), the Court concluded that in the absence of fraud, illegality, or a conflict of interest, a decision by a board of directors should not be disturbed as long as it had some ratinal basis, evenif in hindsight, the decision was wrong.  

In applying the rule to the facts, the Court said:

we are not satisfied that the motives assigned to Phillip K. Wrigley, and through him to the other directors, are contrary to the best interests of the corporation and the stockholders.  For eample, it appears to us that the effect on the neighborhood might well be considered by a director who was considering the patrons who would or would not attend the games if the park were in a poor neighorhood.  Furthermore, the long run interest of the corporation in its property value at Wrigley Field might demand all efforts to keep the neighborhood from deterioprating.  By these thoughts we do not mean to say that the decision of the directors was a correct one.  That is beyond our jurisdiction and ability.  We are merely saying that the decision is one properly before directors and the motives alleged in the amended complaint showed no fraud, illegality or conflict of interest in their making of that decision. 

Then the Court proceeded to dissect Shlensky's other arguments, finding fault with his failure to demonstrate a causal link between night ganes and increased profits or to consider the additional expenses installation of lights and playing of night games might involve. 

The Just One Bad Century website "dedicated to the long suffering fans of Chicago's favorite baseball team" (which may become one of my favorite websites) argues that the relative greater success of the Cubs making the post season since lights were installed shows that the Cubs real problem has been so many day games.  If so, then perhaps the real curse on the Cubs was the deference given to the baseball purists on the Cubs Corporation who refused to allow lights at Wrigley Field forty years ago. 

What If?  Of course now less deference is given to directors so the case might come out differently today.  But suppose Shlensky had commissioned an authoritative consulatant's report demonstrating quantitatively the substantially greater profitability of night baseball.  And that the directors simply ignored this.  Would the Court have given Shlensky more of a hearing and been less of an apologist for the directors?  In some parallel universe, the Cubs have already won the World Series repeatedly.      

The Rest of the Story.... And for those who want to know the rest of the story, check out this timeline of the road to lights at Wrigley Field  which has such gems as....

  • Shlensky was a 27 year old lawyer (somehow that figures) who had owned two shares of Cubs Corporation since he was 14.
  • In 1941,P.K. Wrigley actually bought lights to be installed at Wrigley Field for 6 PM twilight starts.  However, Pearl Harbor intervened and the steel for the light poles was donated to the war effort.
  • In1982, the public was told the choice was lights or the Cubs would move.  A Wrigleyville citizens group named Citizens United for Baseball in the Sunshine (CUBS) was formed to oppose installation of lights.
  • The first Wrigley Field game under the lights began on August 8, 1988 against the Phillies, but it was rained out after 3 1/2 innings.
  • Restrictions on the number of night games played still exist.

And finally...

Got my power back on Thursday night and while I realize that's nothing compared to what folks in Texas are dealing with, I will tell you that reading by flashlight does not work nearly as well now as when I was a kid.  Also that I apparently spend an awfully lot of time on my laptop in the evenings and need to buy a new battery since the one I have only gives me an houor of juice.  On the plus side, I definitely caught up on my sleep and found out how great it can feel not to be sleep- deprived.  So I suppose the whole experience was useful.

I will be going to Oregon in a few days for a golf trip with friends so I may or may not get a chance to post before i leave.   

Guaranteeing Seven Days of Paid Sick Leave -Ohio's Healthy Families Act

In addition to what is proving to be an unusually interesting Presidential election campaign, one of the "hot" issues in Ohio this year is a ballot issue called the Healthy Families Act .  Voters will be asked to decide whether to enact into law a measure that would force businesses with 25 or more employees to guarantee their employees at least seven (7) days sick leave.  Similar measures are apparently playing out all across the country according to the National Partnership for Women & Families.  There's also a bill in Congress on the subject as explained by the HR Capitalist blog in the post: Why You May Add 7 Paid Sick Days to Your PTO Policy in 2009.

I am not a labor lawyer and as yet I haven't really digested the proposed law.  But last week I actually got a call from one of the factions asking if I was going to write about it.  So that got me to thinking about the importance of this proposed legislation to Ohio businesses and made me decide that I probably should make a post about it.

Mike Bowers of the Ideas to Deals blog has an excellent post summarizing the basics of the Healthy Families Act.  A Columbus Dispatch editorial supports passage of the law. However, as Ohio Employer's Law Blog's Jon Hyman notes in his post, Governor Strickland's press release against the Healthy Families Act, Ohio's Democratic Governor has come out against the Act.  In this press release, Gov Strickland calls the ballot initiative " unworkable, unwieldy, and ,,, detrimental to Ohio's economy." 

Solely in the interests of providing information (and not necessarily as an endorsement) here is a fact sheet and an economic impact fact sheet provided to me from those seeking to defeat the measure.  If someone wants to send me similar fact sheets in favor, I'll post those too.   

Earlier this year, Jon Hyman of the Ohio Employer's Law Blog posted a fairly detailed analysis concluding the measure should be rejected in his post Deconstructing the Ohio Healthy Families Act and received many posted comments.  Jon has also promised to post further updates as we get closer to decision day.  

In Jon's post, he also gathers some links to organizations interested in the Act, most of which seem to be opposed to the measure.  In the interests of full information being out there, here are some other links:

  • Ohioans for Healthy Families, the group lobbying for the legislation on its Sick Days Ohio website has several news items favoring the Act, explains why one might.believe it's necessary, and how to get involved on that side of the issue
  • Policy Matters Ohio, a nonproft research organization has also come out in favor of the Act.
  • Ohio Business Votes, a lobbying group opposing the measure, has an informational website explaining how the Act would negatively affect both employers and employees. 

Jon also provides some guidance as to Should businesses be reviewing paid sick leave policies in advance of the Healthy Families Act.

I'm not really sure yet what I think,either professionally or personally.  On the one hand it boggles my mind that there are actually businesses of any size out there that don't provide at least this much paid sick leave in this day and age.  And it seems fundamental to me that, especially given how long it usually takes to see a doctor once you show up for your appointment, we ought to require this sort of thing.

On the other hand, I am mindful of the burden the Healthy Families Act may place on businesses.  And the fact that Gov. Strickland thinks it's a bad idea is also very influential on me.

So for me, the issue is really about understanding how big a burden this places on businesses.  If I ultimately conclude it's enormous, then I will probably, reluctantly, be opposed to its passage.

UPDATE: The Healthy Families Act has been pulled from Ohio's November ballot.  The push for federal legislation continues.

Business Courts - Coming to an Ohio Court Near You (Maybe)

If you wait long enough, all things old become new again. For a brief four year period over 150 years ago, Ohio had a statutory “commercial court” in which business oriented disputes were resolved. Now a new four-year pilot program will try the idea out again.

New Age of Business Courts

Ohio is among many jurisdictions experimenting with the concept of specialized courts for “business” disputes. One of the driving forces behind this trend seems to be the impression/assumption that having such a specialized court is instrumental in attracting and retaining businesses to a state.  This article about New Hampshire's recent jump on to the business court bandwagon gives you the flavor of this sentiment. 

The 200-year-old Delaware Court of Chancery is of course the grand-daddy of them all. However, Chicago, Manhattan, and North Carolina have had such courts for more than a decade and Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Las Vegas, Reno, Atlanta, Boston, and Pittsburgh have also instituted business courts in some form. Most recently Maine and South Carolina have implemented programs. Colorado and Michigan are currently giving serious consideration to the possibility.  For more information, visit the following:

Lee Applebaum has penned a very informative article published in the March/April 2008 issue of the American Bar Association’s Business Law Today magazine entitled “The ‘New’ Business Courts: Responding to Modern Business and Commercial Disputes” which provides an excellent overview of the new trend towards specialized business courts. As Lee explains, the new “business” courts tend to have jurisdiction extending beyond the traditional equity jurisdiction exercised by the Delaware Court of Chancery. In addition to the variety of procedural approaches various jurisdictions have taken in establishing “business” courts and/or “commercial dockets”, the scope of cases accepted differs from one court to another.  

  • The same issue also has a number of other articles focusing on business/commercial and other specialized courts, both in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world.

Ohio's New  "Business" Courts 

About a year ago, Ohio Chief Justice Thomas Moyer appointed a Task Force to study the best method for establishing commercial litigation dockets in Ohio’s trial courts.  The Ohio Supreme Court has now approved a pilot program permitting Common Pleas Courts in five counties to voluntarily institute business courts pursuant to new temporary rules 1.01 to 1.11 of the Rules of Superintendence of the Courts. Carolyn Kobus, a law clerk at my law firm this summer, prepared an excellent summary of these rules.

Business First (which continues to persist in  requiring paid access to its archives) gave this update as to Ohio generally and Hamilton County in particular.  Hamilton County has already moved forward with the plan and Franklin County is currently considering how to implement business courts. The Ohio Supreme Court's Temp. Sup R. 1.03 sets out the sorts of cases that will be accepted; they are:

  1. formation, governance, dissolution, or liquidation of a business entity
  2. rights or obligations between or among the owners, shareholders, partners, or members of a business entity, or rights and obligations between or among any of them and the entity
  3. Trade secret, non-disclosure, non-compete, or employment agreements involving a business entity and an owner, sole proprietor, shareholder, partner, or member thereof
  4. rights, obligations, liability, or indemnity of an officer, director, manager, trustee, partner, or member of a business entity owed to or from the business entity
  5. Disputes between or among two or more business entities or individuals as to their business or investment activities relating to contracts, transactions, or relationships between or among them, including without limitation the following:
    • Transactions governed by the uniform commercial code, except for consumer product liability claims
    • purchase, sale, lease, or license of, or a security interest in, or the infringement or misappropriation of, patents, trademarks, service marks, copyrights, trade secrets, or other intellectual property;
    • purchase or sale of a business entity or the assets of a business entity;
    • sale of goods or services by a business entity to a business entity
    • Non-consumer bank or brokerage accounts, including loan, deposit, cash management, and investment accounts
    • Surety bonds and suretyship or guarantee obligations of individuals given in connection with business transactions;
    • purchase, sale, lease, or license of, or a security interest in, commercial property, whether tangible, intangible personal, or real property
    • Franchise or dealer relationships
    • Business related torts
    • Cases under antitrust laws;
    •  Cases relating to securities, or relating to or arising under federal or state securities laws
    • Commercial insurance contracts, including coverage disputes.

There is also a specific list of cases which the “business” court will not hear; these are:

  • Personal injury, survivor, or wrongful death matters
  • Consumer claims against business entities or insurers of business entities, including product liability and personal injury cases, and cases arising under federal or state consumer protection laws;
  • occupational health or safety, wages or hours, workers’ compensation, or unemployment compensation
  • occupational health or safety, wages or hours, workers’ compensation, or unemployment compensation
  • Matters in eminent domain;
  • Employment law cases
  • Cases in which a labor organization is a party
  • Cases in which a governmental entity is a party
  • Discrimination cases based upon the United States constitution, the Ohio constitution, or the applicable statutes, rules, regulations, or ordinances of the United States, the state, or a political subdivision of the state;
  •  Administrative agency, tax, zoning, and other appeals;
  •  Petition actions in the nature of a change of name of an  individual, mental health act, guardianship, or government election matters
  •  Individual residential real estate disputes, including foreclosure actions, or non-commercial landlord-tenant disputes
  • domestic relations, juvenile, or probate division of the court
  • jurisdiction of a municipal court, county court, mayor’s court, small claims division of a municipal court or county court, or any matter required by statute or other law to be heard in some other court or division of a court
  • Any criminal matter, other than criminal contempt in connection with a matter pending on the commercial docket of the court

Will Ohio's Business Courts Work?

One weakness I see in the pilot program is the assignment procedure for getting the case to a “commercial docket judge.” It relies upon the attorneys involved in the case to file appropriate motions to have the case transferred, and if they fail to do so, by the judge presiding over the case. To me it seems like it would have been a whole lot easier to have the case designated as a “commercial” case when filed and routed directly to the appropriate judge from there. In Franklin County, cases such as foreclosure, professional tort, and other particular sorts of cases are already separately designated by specific letter abbreviations included in the case number they are given. 

In addition, while the temporary rule requires a ruling on the transfer motion with two days, as well as decisions on other motions within 60 days, I’m a bit skeptical as to how often that will actually happen in reality.  

On balance, however, I support the concept of “business” courts. Throughout most of my career much of my litigation experience has occurred in federal bankruptcy court. I have always appreciated the fact that you could proceed to deal with the particular issue involved rather than having to begin each time by educating the judge as to the entire philosophical and structural framework of applicable law.  

In addition, over time, as a “regular” down at bankruptcy court, attorneys come to understand the likely range of results emanating from particular recurring fact patterns. This allows attorney to offer better counsel and advice to clients as to the relative merits of settling or pushing forward with the case. That in turn promotes judicial economy as more cases are resolved by the parties now that they have greater certainty as to possible outcomes.

I hope that the Franklin County Common Pleas judges agree to participate in the pilot program.

UPDATE: The Daily Reporter, the daily legal newspaper in Columbus, reports that Franklin County judges will join Hamilton County in a pilot commercial docket program.  Cuyahoga County, where Cleveland is located, is also expected to approve participation in the pilot program.  The pilot program is supposed to be implemented by early 2009 and would remain in effect through July1, 2012.

UPDATE: The University of Maryland School of Law Journal of Business and Technology's website has an up to date  summary of  Recent Developments in State Business and Technology Courts which briefly explains the status in more than twenty states and also has some interesting recent news briefs.  (Hat tip to Rush Nigut of Rush on Business for this link.)

UPDATE:  The Cuyahoga Common Pleas Court is now on board for the pilot program.  Check out this informative Q & A on business courts appearing in The Cleveland Plain Dealer

All About Enforceability of Noncompetes in Ohio

Suppose you’ve decided that you’ve learned all you can from where you work now and want to put it to use by opening your own company.  Or the grass is looking mighty greener at another company in your industry and you’d like to make a move.  Hold on a minute!  Before you turn in your resignation, you need to consider whether you are subject to a noncompetition agreement, and if so, how that will affect your ability to move on.

What Noncompetes Do

Noncompetition agreements, or noncompetes as they are often called, may be a separate agreement, but are frequently part of an employment agreement.  Their purpose is to protect an employer from unfair competition by restricting the ability of an employee to compete with his or her former employer immediately following termination of employment.  Sometimes employees are asked to sign such an agreement after they have already been employed for quite a while.

Essentially, an employee signing a noncompete promises not to start, work in, own, or otherwise be involved with another company competing for the same business for a specified period of time after that employee stops working for the original company.  The idea is that in the course of doing his or her job, an employee learns valuable nonpublic information about how the company operates. In addition, an employer may have invested time and money in training the employee.

General Enforceability

Usually, employees asked to sign a noncompete have little choice but to agree if they want to work or continue to work for the employer.  Not infrequently, the question comes up as to whether this sort of agreement can be enforced.  Perhaps predictably, the answer depends on many things, including what state you are in and how stringent the restrictions are.

A few states such as California, Montana, and Oklahoma tend to view enforcement of noncompetes as against public policy and severely limit their enforceability.  Others have specific statutes governing use of noncompetes. Several states apply a “reasonableness” test, with some making an up or down decision based on the noncompete as written and others modifying the restrictions as they deem necessary.  Wikipedia has a very detailed Non-compete clause entry which focuses specifically on enforceability in California, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Virginia.

In Ohio, so long as the employer hasn’t gotten greedy, noncompetes are generally enforceable, even if they aren’t signed until long after employment originally began.  The Ohio State Bar Association’s News You Can Use feature offers a concise FAQ regarding “Are Noncompetition Agreements Enforceable in Ohio?”    In determining enforceability, Ohio courts look at three main factors enunciated in Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St.2d 21, 325 N.E. 2d 544 (1975):

  • Whether the restriction is no greater than is necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests
  • Whether the restrictions impose undue hardship on the former employee
  • Whether the restrictions are injurious to the public

How Reasonableness Plays Out

How do these factors work in “real life”?  Of course, every case is different, but there are some general principles. The duration, geographic range, and scope of the prohibition are especially important.  Thus, noncompetes of one year or less are often found enforceable while longer periods become progressively less enforceable. 

Geographic range is related to the nature of the business; if it has a single location and serves only a local clientele, a noncompete prohibiting employment anywhere in the world is unlikely to be enforced.  If there are multiple locations, the prohibited proximity becomes important; restrictions forcing the former employee to work in the next county may be enforceable in these cases.   

Noncompetes which have the effect of preventing any sort of employment by the former employee will generally be found overly broad.  The prohibited activity must be related to the company’s existing or perhaps realistically potential business or industry.

One recent case involving a hairstylist with an eight month noncompete (Charles Penzone, Inc. v. Koster, 2008 Ohio 327 (10th App. Dist.) illustrates how subjective the factors for determining enforceability of noncompetes really are.  It also clearly demonstrates the predominant employer-friendly perspective on the issue which seems to be held by many Ohio courts. 

  • The trial court, in part because there was no evidence the hairstylist had done anything other than service former customers who sought her out, refused to enforce the noncompete.  It also felt that forcing the hairstylist to “scrutinize every potential client who walked through the salon door” was an undue hardship and preventing members of the public from utilizing their preferred stylist was injurious to the public.
  • The Franklin County Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the hairstylist could easily tell which customers were “off-limits” and that the restriction did not prevent those customers from having other hairstylists service them during the restricted period.  

In another case involving a rival title company hiring away a key employee with a five year noncompete, the United States Sixth Circuit analyzed the issues this way in Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985 ( 2007):

Overall, because Chicago Ttle had critical customer and employee relationships to protect, because these relationships directly affected Chicago Ttle’s ability to compete in the market, because Magnuson could influence the continuity of these relationships, because the [noncompete] Covenant contained appropriate geographic and temporal limits, because Magnuson had other means to support himself (his law degree), and because at least some of Magnuson’s relationships were established or strengthened during his employment with Chicago Title, we find that the district court properly concluded that the Covenant was reasonable for at least two years following Magnuson’s departure from Chicago Title.

So what happens if you violate a noncompete?  Your former employer can sue you for damages which may be lost business because of your actions – this could result in very expensive attorney fees -- and the pending lawsuit will often have the effect of lengthening your noncompete period. 

Clients sometimes ask me whether it matters that they signed the noncompete years ago, apparently in the hope that there is some sort of automatic expiration period.  No it does not matter how long ago or how recently you signed the noncompete.   

What if other people have left and the employer has never really enforced the noncompete before?  Well, maybe you might have something here.  This is, by the way, why you should expect to be sued if you violate a noncompete; failing to come after you might make it more difficult for the employer to enforce the noncompete later against someone else.

What if the company gets sold to a new owner?  Read my post on "Can a New Owner Enforce a Noncompete Made by an Employee with the Prior Owner?"

Drafting Tips for Employers

From an employer perspective, the key is to be realistic about the restrictions placed upon former employees.  A 2006 article in HR Magazine by Stephen L. Richey entitled “Tailor Non-competes to a T: a One-Size-Fits-All Non-compete Agreement Won’t Pass a Judge’s Inspection” provides several helpful hints about what to think about.  Employers can also take some comfort in the fact that Ohio courts will usually modify noncompetes that go too far rather than simply refusing to enforce them at all.  

B-to-B Trade Publications for Fun and Profit

Anita Campbell of the Small Business Trends blog has recently offered an interesting post inviting small business owners an opportunity to Monetize Your Website or Blog by Offering Trade Magazines.  Check out both the publications available that you might like  and how you can participate if it seems like a good fit to you.

Anita explains that TradePub.com is a way to get B-to-B trade publications for free and links to the TradePub.com feature on her site.  According to Anita, TradePub.com is now looking for additional blogs and websites interested in affiliating with TradePub.com to offer a trade publication storefront on their website.  In addition to offering an additional service to visitors to your site, you will get paid a fee, varying by publication, for each new subscription your readers make through your storefront.  The fee may be as little as a dollar per subscription, but can also be as much as $5 or $10, or in a few cases, even $20.

I took a look at the publications available and was surprised at the range.  Virtually every industry seems to be represented.  Within minutes, I found two that seemed like they'd be useful to me, including one called The Deal which is described as "the indispensable newsweekly for all dealmakers covering M&A, bankruptcy, private equity, venture capital, law & tax, corporate."  The confirming e-mail said it might take up to 12 weeks for the subscription to kick in, which was a little disappointing, but then I suppose you shouldn't expect too much for free.

As far as signing up to be an affiliate, I'm still thinking about that.  It certainly sounds like a good program.  From what Anita says, it also appears to be low maintenance from the site owner perspective.  Anita also points out that once you sign up, you get stats about which publications are of the most interest to your readers and that can give you useful information about topics your readers are interested in.

To become an affiliate, you must sign-up with RevResponse.

What's Your Tax Basis? Does it Matter?

 I've often said that I consider TAX a four-letter word.  So I was most pleased when CPA Karen deLaubenfels accepted my invitation to make a guest post on this very subject. 

>>>>>>>>>> So, without further ado, KAREN DELAUBENFELS on TAX:....

A business tax issue that is somewhat neglected is owner tax basis, which is, roughly speaking, the owner’s stake in the business. Tax basis of business ownership is a topic of interest regardless of entity choice because it can affect the amount (and whether)  you may owe the government for taxes.  However, we focus here on the tax basis of a corporate shareholder.   

Many entities aside from actual corporations, such as LLCs, may wish to be taxed as a corporation under the “check-the-box” regulations, which allow the non-corporate entity to choose whether to be taxed as a “flow-through” partnership/sole proprietorship or a C (regular) corporation. The C corporation can then elect to be taxed as a “flow-through” S corporation, as Teri Rasmussen mentions in her article, "Taking the Plunge - How to Choose the Right Business Entity for Your Business." In a “flow-through” entity, the owners are taxed on their share of the company’s income, regardless of whether they receive any actual distributions of cash or property. Many of these non-corporate entities choose to be taxed as S corporations to maintain the flow-through aspect of the business, while avoiding possible ambiguity about whether owners may be treated as employees, allowing for withholding and tax-free fringe benefits available only to employees. Regardless of the entity choice, though, basis is a key player in determining taxability of any distributions to owners.

Each business owner has a tax basis in that ownership, unique to that individual. This basis is often, roughly speaking, the owner’s investment, plus earnings of the business, minus distributions to the owners and losses of the business, although the calculation differs somewhat depending on the type of business entity. We’ll focus on an entity that comprises 61.9% of the total number of corporations in the U.S. according to 2003 IRS statistics: the S corporation.

So what happens when the owner of an S corporation takes a distribution of cash or property? The short answer is that it’s generally not taxable, since the owner has already been taxed on the flow-through income; however, the exceptions to this general situation can have serious tax consequences for the business owner, and deserve a look.

An S corporation has a different set-up than other business entities, and is distinct even from other flow-through entities. The owner’s basis in shares of stock generally begins as just their cost, as with any other corporate shares; however, whereas the C corporation owner’s stock basis doesn’t change, the S corporation shareholder’s basis in the shares is a moving target, changing with corporate earnings and the owner’s contributions and distributions. In addition, if the owner makes any loans to the S corporation, there’s an additional quirk of the S corporation, loan basis. Although loan basis is beyond the scope of this post, it should be noted that it can affect the deductibility of corporate flow-through losses, and is thus worthy of consideration by the S corporation shareholder as well. 

Whether a distribution to the shareholder is taxable or not depends on whether the corporation has sufficient AAA, PTI, AEP, and OAA, and then on whether the shareholder has any tax basis in his/her shares.

This jumble of letters deserves some explanation. 

  • AAA (the Accumulated Adjustments Account) tracks the corporation’s contributions, taxable earnings/losses, and distributions. A positive balance in this account represents corporate earnings that have been taxed as flow-through income, but not yet distributed to owners.
  • PTI (Previously Taxed Income) is an “old-school” analog of AAA, which is only (possibly) relevant for S corporations that were in existence before 1983.
  • AEP (Accumulated Earnings and Profits) is only (possibly) relevant for S corporations that were formerly C corporations. AEP is a topic in itself, and deserves its own separate discussion. For now, let’s note that any distributions from AEP are taxable as corporate dividends.
  • Finally, OAA (the Other Adjustments Account) tracks the corporation’s non-taxable items affecting shareholder basis. This would include such items as tax-exempt municipal bond interest and “key person” life insurance proceeds, along with their associated non-deductible expenses.

Every time a cash or property distribution is made to shareholders, it reduces the balances in these accounts, in the order given above. As long as distributions do not use up AAA and PTI, they are not taxable. If AAA and PTI are gone, any distributions are next deemed to come from AEP, and are taxable as regular corporation dividends, subject to lower tax rates at present. When AEP is gone, distributions are deemed to come from OAA, and are again not taxable.

Next, though, we have the situation to watch out for, as it’s generally avoidable with good tax planning: If AAA, PTI, AEP, and OAA are consumed, the distributions are a return of the shareholder’s capital, lowering his basis in his shares. Once basis is used up by distributions, any additional distributions are taxable gain to the shareholder. 

Do you need to know your AAA, PTI, AEP, and OAA?  If your corporation has ever been a C corporation, you need to look at all four. If not, you need at least AAA; if you sell your ownership interest, your taxable gain may be reduced by your share of any positive balance in the AAA account.

Do you need to know your tax basis in your corporate ownership?  Absolutely. How else will you know whether your distributions have crossed the line from tax-free to taxable gain? 

Karen L. deLaubenfels, CPA offers accounting advice, including a full line of tax consulting and preparation service, to clients in Central Ohio.  She also offers Quickbooks consulting and bookeeping services.   For more information, you can visit her website at www.karendcpa.com,  

The Power of Advisory Boards

In recent years, the concept of having an "advisory board" has grown in popularity.  Should your business have one and, if so, how do you get one set up?

An advisory board is similar to a board of directors in some respects, but there are some important differences.  An advisory board is a small group of hand-picked professsionals offering advice to a privately held business in areas the owners may feel they lack skills or experience.  It differs from a board of directors because members of a board of directors make decisions on behalf of the company while an advisory board simply offers suggestions and ideas which may or may not be acted upon.  In addition, those serving on a board of directors have fiduciary duties to all of the company's owners, and in some cases to creditors and other third parties.  

Usefulness of Advisory Boards.  Advisory boards may be particularly useful for more recently formed companies or companies in transitioning to a larger presence in the marketplace, but more established companies can also benefit.  For small businesses with only one or two owners, advisory boards can be a useful resource giving more structure to decisionmaking.  Among the ways an advisory board can be useful are:

  • Strategic Planning.  For companies in transition, having advisory board members who may have "been there, done that" can be helpful in mapping out where a company may want to go next and in providing a reality check as to what may be needed to get there. 
  • Practical Advice and Evaluation.  Advisory board members can fill gaps in business knowledge and be a good sounding board in making ordinary business decisions about personnel policies, prospective business partners and opportunities, marketing and pricing strategy and tactics, etc.
  • Leverage and Influence.   The knowledge, contacts and experience of advisory board members can sometimes lend credibility and clout to the company in its marketplace.  

Putting an Adviosry Board Together.  So how do you get an advisory board put together?  Various nonprofit groups offer advisory board programs.  For example, the Womens Presidents' Organization offers peer advisory boards for its chapter members  In addition, in Columbus, the Advisory Board Exchange - an initative of Business First - offers an ongoing program open to applicants averaging at least $3 million in revenue annually over the past three years and which are headquartered in Central Ohio. 

Another possible organized advisory board alternative  is the Athena PowerLink program sponsored by the Columbus National Association of Women Business Owners (NAWBO) chapter.  One woman-owned business is selected as a recipient each year and provided a custom-tailored group of advisors for a year.  Applicants must have been in business for at least two years, have at least two employees, and generate annual revenues of at least $250,000 for manfacturing concerns or $100,000 for service companies.

Business owners can also put together an advisory board on their own, perhaps starting by asking an attorney, CPA, or financial advisor to serve on the advisory board.  Retired executives may also be good  prospects.  In addition to having a genuine desire to help a business grow and mature, these professionals enjoy the opportunity to meet and become acquainted with other like-minded professionals. 

    

 

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Fun with "Payment in Full" Checks

If you've been in business long at all, somewhere along the line there may well have been some sort of dispute about the amount a customer owes.  And if you've had any contact at all with an attorney, you have undoubtedly been told to watch out for "payment in full"  situations in which you receive checks purporting to be "in full satisfaction" or containing some similar endorsement indicating that the customer intends this payment to be it.  In fact, if you're in Ohio, you have probably been admonished (and maybe even established as policy) that any check accompanied by a such a restrictive endorsement, or any cover correspondence using this language, MUST be returned to the customer. 

Simple enough.  But suppose you receive a cover letter enclosing a check for less than the amount owed which doesn't use these "magic" terms of art?  What if the letter specifically states that it is not placing any restrictive endorsement on the check to you, but hastens to add something to the effect that this is all the money we believe is owed to you?

In Ohio, the answer has changed over the years.   Prior to the 1989 Ohio Supreme Court case of AFC Interiors v. DiCello, 46 Ohio St.3d 1, 544 N.E.2d 869 (1989), creditors faced the dilemma of having to choose between  accepting the lesser amount offered and writing off the balance or rejecting the partial payment being offered in favor of pursuing the debtor for the entire amount due.  If a check offered "in full payment" or "in full satisfaction" was cashed by the creditor, the remaining amount owed simply could not be recovered.

From 1989 through 1994, there followed a glorious period for creditors in which they could rely upon Ohio Rev. Code 1301.13 to take the partial payment AND still pursue the debtor for the balance if they did so while make a "reservation of rights".  Thus if the creditor endorsed the check by writing words such as "under protest" or "without prejudice" just above their endorsement before cashing the check, the creditor had managed to have its cake and eat it too.  In this way, creditors accepted the partial payment, applied it against the balance owing and then were permittred to continue further collection efforts.  

All this changed in 1994 when Ohio adopted the revised version of Uniform Commercial Code Articles 3 and 4.  As a result of the change in the law, making a reservation of rights was no longer possible.  In addition, if the partical payment was accompanied by correspondence indicating that the payment was ended to satisfy the obligation in full. cashing the check meant that the creditor could not pursue the trmaining ballance.  New Ohio Rev. Code 1303.40 (A), which remains in effect today, provided that

the claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim.

 This had the effect of returning Ohio to the pre-1989 common law era.

So, today, do not be fooled if receiving a partial payment check.  In addition to the obvious situation in which it is clearly marked as "payment in full", you must also pay attention to the correspondence accompanying the payment.  If that correspondence indicates that the sender does not intend to pay the balance, then you are cashing the check at your own risk, even if there is no restrictive endorsement placed  on the check.  

Forming Contracts in the Age of George Jetson and Spacely Space Sprockets

Perhaps you remember the Saturday morning cartoon The Jetsons featuring poor George Jetson and his trials and tribulations in a future filled with all manner of technological conveniences.  (Click here if you've just been hit with a wave of nostalgia and want to relive episodes.)  George's job at Spacely Space Sprockets mostly consisted  of pushing a button at his computer, sorta like all of us do now. 

While George may have intended to make contracts with the push of the button, we don't always realize that's exactly what we've done.  Sometimes it's not "just" e-mail - you just made a binding contract.

Most of us think of e-mail as an informal casual form of communication.  As a result, we tend to be much less careful about what we say than when we put it in an old fashioned letter. And that could be trouble when sending e-mail about the terms of a business deal you think you're still "just" negotiating.  I've posted before about how a series of letters exchanged between two parties can sometimes result in a contract being formed.  The same thing can happen with e-mails, or even voicemail.

Uniform Electronic Transaction Act. Ever heard of the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act (UETA), codified in Ohio in 2000 as Ohio Revised Code Chapter 1306?  It takes contracts into the 21st century by expanding the meaning of what it means to be the time honored "written agreement" and "signature" needed to form a binding contract enforceable against the parties to it. 

The UETA defines an "electronic record" in such a way as to include both e-mail and voicemail.  In addition, an "electronic signature", defined as "an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted  by a person with the intent to sign a record", can easily include something as simple as typing your name at the end of an e-mail or even just saying your name when leaving a voicemail. 

The provisions of UETA apply whenever the parties have agreed to conduct negotiations by electronic means.  Importantly, no formal agreement to use these channels is necessary - it can be implied from the surrounding situation and circumstances, including the conduct of the parties.  So... if you use e-mail to work out and close a business transaction, you are potentially at risk for creating a binding contract before you may have intended to do so. 

Real Life Example.  Is this really a potential problem or is it just another of any number of "parade of horribles" that never actually happens in "real life"?  Consider the following e-mail exchange in a recent case (Klebanoff et al. v. Haberle et al., 978 So.2d 598 (La. App, 2008)) regarding the purported settlement of a dispute involving a mineral lease:

  • Phillips: "If you want, you can just propose [the plaintiffs} pay me for what I have in the deal and I will convey my interest to them."
  • Scott: "We agree to this proposal of settlement."
  • Phillips: Demands payment in full, saying "I will not finance.... would expect to be paid for what we have invested at which point we would convey the interest over."
  • Scott: Offer accepted, but also says, "Now it seems as if the only issue that we do not have a complete meeting of the minds with respect to is how much your aunts will 'finance' this transaction/compromise and how much time you will allow them to do it."  Includes other comments, including gratuitous comment that plaintiffs had been "coerced" into signing over the interest at stake.
  • Phillips: "I wll no longer try to work with you, your clients can either pay $56,136,10 in two weeks or I will have my attorney contact you.... Please let me know how you would like to proceed."
  • Scott: Indicates "thrown for loop" by demand for immediate payment instead of payment plan, but says, "Nevertheless, subject to working out the financing aspect, we have a compromise.  I will do what I can do to scrounge up some financing for Carla and Melinda."
  • Phillips: "If I don't receive the money before the logging of the 30-3 the deal is off and you will have to resume litigation....  Expect a letter outlining our conversation and my proposal from my attorney.  I will have [the accountant] include the information you requested below."
  • Scott: "I am pleased we have a deal.... I look forward to hearing from your attorney so we can get this matter concluded." 
  • Phillips: "What deal do we have?  The 33% back in after payout or the payment of the un-recovered funds before logging the Frierson 30-3."
  • Scott: Inquires why hasn't gotten the documentation "to close our settlement of a return assignment of yours and Haberle's interest in the Yarber lease for the unrecovered amount of $56,000."
  • Phillips: "The 33 percent back-in is the current structure....  However, I would rather just get the money I have in it back and move on....  We can make the deal effective Feb 1 and any additional funds received will be forwarded to your clients."
  • Scott: Advises that $$ ready to be transferred and requests assignment documentation to be executed.
  • Some back and forth e-mails about the assignment and preparation of a general release.  Scott eventually files with the Court to enforce the settlement.

>>>>> Court determined that the parties had indeed reached a binding agreement, saying:

the parties'positions were clearly expressed in writings which are recognized under the [UETA].  The object of their communication was never anything other than a compromise,  We find no presumption of an intent not to be bound until the execution of a contract in a special form. 

So what should you do?  Stop using e-mail and voicemail?  Well maybe yes if you want to be super safe.  But for the rest of us who can't imagine how we ever did business without e-mail and voicemail, the best answer is to be just a little more careful in using e-mail and voicemail.

  • If you're frequently using e-mail to reach a deal with someone, it may be a good idea to add a standard disclaimer below your signature line indicating that the message is not intended to form a binding contract until ultimately reduced to a single document signed by both parties.  If you don't want to include this sort of disclaimer on all your e-mails, at least mention something early on, and perhaps later as well, about how of course everything needs to be reduced to a separate written agreement and reviewed by your attorney before it becomes binding. 
  • When leaving a voicemail, don't get so specific on all the terms unless you really are at the point that you're ready to have a deal.  Sometimes it might just be better  to leave a short "call me" message.

My Favorite Ohio-Based Law Blogs

Now that I've been doing this law blog thing for about eight months, I've had a chance to get acquainted with my neighbors in the blogosphere.  There are of course my subject matter compatriots all across the country that I've enjoyed coming to know through their blogs (Chris Moander of the relatively new Wisconsin Business Law and Litigation blog and Rush Nigut of Rush on Business from Iowa (the home in my youth) especially come to mind).  But today I wanted to focus on my geographically proximate neighbors practicing law in Ohio while writing their blogs.  

Like anyone else I have my favorites.  I don't claim to be any arbiter of quality or worth so the following is really nothing more than what I've found I've liked the most so far. 

Perhaps my own personal favorite Ohio-based blog is The Briefcase which has been published by solo practitioner Russ Bensing for quite a while.   It promises to provide "commentary and analysis of Ohio law" and it certainly delivers.  Russ gives brief summaries and case updates of Ohio civil and criminal cases decided by the various Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court with a bit more criminal than civil cases.  While this is of course useful, his regular "Friday Roundup" feature focusing on the more entertaining legal cases out there is a must-read for me every week.  In addition, even the case updates and summaries are given with a definite bit of "attitude" that makes them much more interesting than the usual dry case summary.  And his "About" section is particularly well done.  Russ's stuff is not often the sort of thing I tend to link to (which may say more about me than him), but I certainly appreciate his contributions.

My other "substantive" favorite  Ohio-based blog is the Ohio Employer's Law Blog published by Jon Hyman of Kohrman, Jackson & Krantz  for more than a year.  Its tagline is  "Practical employment law information for businesses in Ohio and beyond."  What I like about this blog is Jon's well written, informative, and useful (even "practical") posts about important issues in the labor and employment law areas.  I also think Jon's analysis of the legal issues he covers is clear and seems right on point.  In addition, I like his regular "What I'm Rreading" series which features several quick links to other interesting posts around the blogosphere.  I don't practice in this area so I appreciate having such excellent resource available to keep me up to date about pertinent legal developments. 

Ohio Employer's Law Blog is one of two Ohio-based blogs focusing on employment and labor issues.  The other is Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur's Employer Law Report which says it will be "Reporting on recent legal developments and trends affecting employers".  It has been published sporadically over the last couple of years, but now seems to be adding new worthwhile posts more frequently. 

The D&O Diary published by Kevin M. LaCroix of Oakbridge Insurance Services, an insurance intermediary focused exclusively on management liability issues, focuses on perhaps the most complex issues of any Ohio-based law blog.  It is intended to be "A Periodic Journal Containing Items of Interest from the World of Directors and Officers Liability, with Occasional Commentary".  I haven't had much chance to become fully acquainted with this blog yet, but hope to so in the near future.

When it comes to coverage of both substantive and professional developments of interest to Ohio lawyers, I like the Cleveland Law Library Weblog the best.  It explains that "our goal is to inform local attorneys of major legal developments important to their practice".    I often find ideas for posts by reading this blog and appreciate the links usually provided.  The Cincinnati Law Library Blog  and the Moritz Legal Information Blog which provides "Legal Information and Research Resources Brought to You by The Michael E. Moritz Law Library at The Ohio State University" also provide these sort of services.

One of the newest Ohio-based law blogs is the Ohio Real Estate Blog published by the attorneys of the Real Estate Practice Group of Kohrman, Jackson & Krantz which started up only a couple of months ago in April.  In same real estate practice area is the Build on This! blog published by the attorneys of the Real Estate and Construction Practice Group of Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, LLP which offers "Current news, information, and events affecting the real estate, construction and land use industry and its professionals".

Another recent addition to the blogosphere is the Reasonable Doubts blog published by Jeffrey Davis.  It started in March 2008 and, as its name would suggest, focuses on crminal law.  In addition, the Ohio Family Law Blog, published by Robert Mues of Holzfaster, Cecil, McKnight & Mues, LPA, began in December 2007 and tries to provide "Family Law and Divorce Information for Ohio Families Seeking Solutions".

Interestingly, there are TWO Ohio based law blogs called Sixth Circuit BlogOne seems to focus on criminal law and offers "Case summaries and commentaries by federal defenders of the Sixth Circuit".  The other, published more sporadically by Eric Zagrans, focuses primarily on civil law and is "Devoted to Appellate Law and Practice Within the Sixth Circuit and Its Constituent States"

Rounding out the roster of Ohio-based law blogs (at least those I'm aware of) are the following with which I am less familar, in part because they relate to areas of law with which I have less experience in my day to day practice:

While there are several newer Ohio based law blogs, there are also many that have been published for two or three years or even longer.  There are also some earlier Ohio-based blogs that are no longer publishing.  In addition, there are several "business" blogs based in Ohio that touch on legal issues from time to time, but that's a subject for another day.

I hope I haven't forgotten anyone, but if I have, just add a comment with your URL and then we'll know about you too. 

Piercing the Corporate Veil Ohio Supreme Court Oral Argument

From the comfort and convenience of my office computer this morning, I watched the oral argument before the Ohio Supreme Court in Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Case No. 2007-2162.  In this case. the Court was asked to answer the question "when may a tort plaintiff pierce the corporate veil to pursue recovery from a "parent" corporation".  The Court allowed both sides substantially more than the allotted 15 minutes each, asking both attorneys numerous questions. 

  • As an aside I want to mention how wonderful it is to be able to see Ohio Supreme Court oral argument without the hassles of parking and transportation. The Ohio Supreme Court has been doing this since early 2004. but this was my first experience utilizing the option. Not only did I save the time coming and going (in pouring rain today I might add), I tuned in a little early and was able to work on other matters right up to the minute oral argument began. The picture is clear and shows close-ups of the attorneys and Justices as they speak. The sound quality is terrific. In many respects, this was actually better than going in person.  You can still see the oral argument by going to the video archives.
  • I have a case coming up shortly before the Ohio Supreme Court which does involve the corporate veil piercing issue. So I suppose I'm just a little more interested than I otherwise would be, even though at the moment we're only up on a preliminary procedural issue. (If I don't win on that, we'll be back on the corporate veil piercing issue later.)

Suzanne Richards of Vorys, Sater, Seymore & Pease argued on behalf of the defendant-appellant "parent" company shareholder against which plaintiff-appellee Dombroski seeks recovery.  Robert Palmer appeared on behalf of Ms. Dombroski.  Both attorneys were extremely well prepared.  Although the Ohio Council of Retail Merchants, Ohio Chamber of Commerce,  the Ohio Chapter of the National Federation of Independent Business, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation jointly submitted an amici curaie brief in support of the defendant parent company, they did not participate in the oral argument.

Factual and Procedural Background.  In a nutshell, the most salient facts are that Ms. Dombroski was denied insurance coverage for a procedure deemed "experimental".    Ms. Dombroski had a health insurance policy issued by defendant Community Insurance Company ("CIC") which utilized Anthem  UM Services, Inc. ("AUMS") to administer its policies and process claims.  Still another company, Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc.  ("AICI") defined the scope of the coverages under CIC policies.  CIC, AUMS, and AICI were all subsidiaries of  defendant Wellpoint, Inc. ("Wellpoint").  Coverage was apparently denied as a result of a blanket policy by defendant AICI.  Dombroski sued everyone for bad faith denial of her claim.  Counsel for Ms. Dombroski conceded that undercapitalization was not an issue.

AICI and Wellpoint filed motions to dismiss each of them as a party defendant on the grounds that the contract was with CIC and not with them and there was no grounds for bypassing the corporate entities.  The trial court agreed, but the Seventh Appellate District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the second prong of the Belvedere test could be satisfied through the showing of an "unjust" or "inequitable" act even if it did not rise to level of fraud or illegality  On appeal, the proper interpretation of Belvedere for determining when it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil was certified because of a conflict among the Courts of Appeal.

Oral Argument Synopsis.  All of this is a very long introduction to the oral argument itself.  Counsel for Wellpoint emphasized that the second prong of  Belvedere required the parent company/shareholder to have "perpetrated a second wrong" by deliberately destroying the ability of the defendant subsidiary to satisfy any judgment against it.  Counsel for Ms. Dombroski emphasized that "piercing the corporate veil" is an "equitable argument" and that insurance bad faith claims are "fairness torts".  He also emphasized thhat Wellpoint set corporate policy for the subsidiaries.  Several of the Justices seemed to have difficulty understanding the complete corporate structure and a couple asked if perhaps the case was not yet ripe for determination.

Justice Pfeifer suggested that perhaps the Court didn't think all that carefully about  the test formulated in Belvedere because the veil piercing was a relatively small part of that case and that the whole test should be re-evaluated.  Later in the oral argument, he posed the question of what would happen if and when the plaintiff tried to depose the nonparty parent regarding the establishment of the policy leading to the denial of coverage.

Chief Justice Moyer suggested that, although the question certified was the proper interpretation of Belvedere, the case could actually be decided on much narrower grounds.  He posited that if a medical insurance company sets up a subsidiary with the purpose of hindering recovery by plaintiffs, that would be "illegal" and easily fall within all interpretations of Belvedere's second prong.  Justice Lanzinger later asked a similar question.

Justice Stratton seemed to think (and I tend to agree) that Dombroski should have an adequate direct claim against CIC and consequently no veil piercing argument was necessary.  Justice O'Connor was concerned that focusing on whether an "unjust" or "inequitable" act might "open the floodgates" for litigation in this area; she indicated that she felt that there had to be "some level of dishonesty"  before recovery could be had.      

My Thoughts.  I tend to agree that more must be proven than just that there was an "unjust" or "inequitable" act perpetrated on the plaintiff to justify piercing the corporate value.  Otherwise the three prong test of Belvedere is really collapsed into a single inquiry.  I also think that sometimes the world is not fair and people who really don't deserve it suffer misfortune; I don't think that someone else should be held responsible for this occurrence in every case.

At the same time, I am not altogether sure that the more stringent test really helps the defendant "parent" company in this particular instance.  It does seem to me that the multiplicity of subsidiaries may well have been set up to thwart policyholders seeking to challenge denial of coverage.  To the extent that is true, I think the parent company may have abused the underlying  conceptual policies of limited liability and should be denied the benefits of that legal doctrine as a consequence.

I am also concerned, however, as to what effect a more "flexible" standard for determining when piercing the corporate veil is permissible would have on closely held companies with a limited number of individuals as equity owners.  Here, especially, something more sinister than suffering by the plaintiff ought to be required.  If that is all that is necessary, then every complaint should include a count seeking the piercing of the corporate veil.  Almost by definition, if there is any actionable claim at all, it is because something "unjust" or "inequitable" happened to the plaintiff.

Perhaps the answer is to introduce further confusion by bifurcating the standards for piercing the corporate veil, having one applicable only to closely held entities, or at least to imposing personal liability against individuals, while the other is applicable only to more sophisticated transactions.

Oh yeah - how do I want it to come out to help my case?  I like the Belvedere standard just as it is, thank you, and wouldn't mind if you made it even more restrictive.

For more on the piercing the corporate veil concept and Belvedere, read my previous post on Piercing the Corporate Veil- What It Means and How to Avoid It. 

New Standards for "Piercing the Corporate Veil" Cases?

Everyone hates insurance companies, especially when they deny individual policyholders coverage for medical treatment.  But does that mean that corporate formalities should be ignored to permit the unfortunate policyholder to bring an action against the parent company of the subsidiary denying coverage on the grounds of a bad faith breach of the insurance policy contract?  Is it enough if the Court finds that "unjust" or "inequitable" acts have occurred even if they don't rise to the level of fraud or illegal action?  On its face, that is what the Ohio Supreme Court is called upon to decide in Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Inc., et al., Case No. 2007-2162 when  it hears oral argument in the case on Wednesday (June 4, 9 AM, third case on the docket) this week.    

Interpreting Belvedere.  However, the Ohio Supreme Court has taken the opprtunity to resolve a conflict among Ohio Courts of Appeal concerning what is required to"pierce the corporate veil" and impose liability upon a corporation's shareholders or upon the parent company of a corporate subsidiary.  In a January 23, 2008 Entry, the Court ordered the parties to brief the following:

Does the second prong of Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners' Assn. v. R.E. Rourke Cos.. Inc. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 274, which states that the corporate veil can be pierced when control of the corporation "was exercised in such a manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act against the person seeking to disregard the corporate entity" also allow the corporate veil to be pierced in cases where control was exercised to commit unjust or inequitable acts that do not rise to the level of fraud or an illegal act?

The Ohio Supreme Court's Communications Office has prepared a concise summary of the factual and procedural background of the Dombroski case, as well as the specific insurance-related issue presented.  You can see and hear the oral argument from the comfort of your own computer, either live or in the archives as early as close of business on the day of oral argument, through the use of streaming video technology. 

By consulting the Supreme Court's on-line docket, you can also review or download the briefs filed in the case, including an amicus curiae brief filed jointly in support of the appellant-defendant parent company by the Ohio Council of Retail Merchants, Ohio Chamber of Commerce,  the Ohio Chapter of the National Federation of Independent Business, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation.  The defendant-appellant's brief has a rather extensive survey of caselaw in Ohio and elsewhere addressing the proper standard for "piercing the corporate veil." 

Deciding What It Takes to "Pierce the Corporate Veil".  The Belvedere decision established a three prong test to be met before a corporate form may be disregarded and shareholders held personally liable for the misdeeds of a corporation, namely:

  • Control over the corporation by those to be held liable so complete that the corporation had no separate mind, will or existence of its own.
  • Control over the corporation by those to be held liable was exercised in such a manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act against the person seeking to disregard the corporate entity.
  • Injury or unjust loss resulted to the person seeking to disregard the corporate entity from such control and wrong.   

Some courts, includ