Making a "Federal Case" Out of a Cognovit Judgment
How would Peanuts’ Linus manage without his trusty security blanket? Depending on the result, the Sixth Circuit reaches in a recently appealed cognovit judgment case, financial institutions such as banks and others relying on cognovit notes, and perhaps ordinary promissory notes as well, may well have to face a similar question.
Every guaranty I’ve seen has some variation of what is sometimes called an “indulgence” clause. These provisions essentially say that a guaranty remains in effect even if the Bank waives a default by the primary obligor or errs in its collection efforts. Now a federal district court, applying Ohio law, has snatched this security blanket away, saying that such a clause does not allow the lender to ignore the credit terms of a loan with impunity.
In Huntington National Bank v. Wallace, 2009 WL 2023891 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (Case No.09CV408, Carr, J.), decided August 19, 2009, the defendant guarantor alleged he had a meritorious defense justifying vacation of the cognovit judgment taken against him. His argument was that because the Bank made a “material alteration” to the terms of his guaranty by continuing to allow advances even though the amount outstanding exceeded the prescribed “maximum amount”, his guaranty obligation was rendered invalid.
The Bank has now appealed the case to the Sixth Circuit (Case No. 09-4172). If upheld, the decision may have far reaching consequences beyond cognovit notes. The district court decision suggests that the ONLY modification to an obligation that a lender may comfortably do is an extension of time unless the guarantor agrees. It could also be taken as meaning that even if the guarntor consents, such modifications would release the guarantor of all liability
Factual Background
The underlying fact scenario is a common one. In August 2007, a company known as Bellepointe entered into a First Amended and Restated Loan and Security Agreement “Loan Agreement”) with the Bank. The Loan Agreement governed three separate obligations – a term note, a line of credit, and a “Guidance Line” involving draws on letters of credit. Michael Wallace (“Wallace”), the father of the company’s owner, executed a guaranty of Bellepointe’s indebtedness to the Bank; the son also executed a guaranty, but the case pertains only to the father’s guaranty.
The guaranty excluded any liability for the term loan indebtedness and also capped the maximum amount of liability with respect to the Line of Credit. The crux of the case focused on the proper interpretation of certain language found in the Loan Agreement and the Guidance Line cognovit note, to wit:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, the maximum amount available under the Guidance Line shall be as follows:
from the date hereof through and including 11/30/07 - $865,000
12/1/07 through and including 12/31/07 - $250,000
1/1/08 and thereafter - $550,000
These provisions obviously required a substantial reduction in the amount outstanding as of December 1, 2007. It is not altogether uncommon for lines of credit to require a substantial reduction in the amount outstanding at least once a year.
Procedural History
Procedurally, the case is a bit complicated. Apparently there was some discussion back and forth between Wallace and the Bank concerning his liability prior to any lawsuit being filed. When those talks broke down, Wallace filed a declaratory judgment action in the Southern District of Ohio federal district court against the Bank on February 11, 2009. Two days later, the Bank took a cognovit judgment against Wallace in Lucas County Common Pleas Court. The Bank said it had no knowledge of the declaratory judgment action when it took the cognovit judgment.
Wallace promptly removed the state court cognovit judgment action to federal district court for the Northern District of Ohio, apparently on diversity grounds that he was a resident of Florida, and sought relief from judgment. After the Northern District federal court granted the motion to vacate the cognovit judgment, the Bank appealed to the Sixth Circuit where the case is now pending. It appears likely that the Southern District declaratory judgment action will be consolidated with the pending Northern District cognovit action.
The Decision
Wallace alleged that the Bank continued to make advances on the Guidance Line in December 2007 even though Bellepointe had failed to reduce the amount outstanding as required. Consequently, he contended that the Bank’s actions caused a “material alteration” in the nature of his guaranty obligation, thereby relieving him of liability under his guaranty. The Bank did not dispute that the advannces exceeded the "maximum amount." However,it countered by pointing out that its loan documents had one of those “indulgence clauses” which stated:
Guarantor hereby promises that if one or more of the Obligations are not paid promptly when due, he will pay the Obligations to Bank, irrespective of any action or lack of action on the Bank's part in connection with the acquisition, perfection, possession, enforcement or disposition of any or all Obligations.... Guarantor agrees that no extension of time, whether one or more, nor any other indulgence granted to [sic] Bank by [sic] Debtor, or to any other gurantor, or any of them, and no omission or delay on Bank's part in exercising the right against, or in taking any action to collect from or pursue Bank's remedies against Debtor or any other guarantor, or any of them, will release, discharge or modify the duties of guarantor hereunder.
In addition, the Bank insisted that it was obligated to pay the draws on outstanding letters of credit in any event and that the definition of “advances” used in the line of credit differed from the definition of “maximum amount available” for precisely this reason. It also argued that the “indulgence” provisions in Wallace’s guaranty allowed it to ignore Bellepointe’s default in any event.
So what happened? The federal district court agreed that the provisions of the loan documents did allow the Bank to continue making advances in December 2007. However, the court also noted that “Wallace’s burden is only to allege a meritorious defense, not to prove that he will prevail.” It went on to say:
Even if Wallace had initially failed to allege sufficient facts to support his defense, he has subsequently submitted an affidavit describing the above referenced facts, Wallace alleged sufficient facts for this court to evaluate whether his defense is meritorious.
And the reason? The Court cited Toland v. Key Bank of Wyoming, 847 P.2d 540 (1993) and Frost National Bank v. Burge, 29 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. App. 2000) for the proposition that “’indulgence’ is limited to extensions of time for payment and contract terms permitting indulgences do not waive suretyship defenses.” That’s it! Really isn’t any further analysis or discussion.
What IS interesting and informative are the briefs of the parties filed in the federal distriuct court case. Leaving out exhibits, but including affidavits,here they are:
Now I think the district court got this wrong and I’d really have appreciated a little further analysis of the pertinent provisions in the loan documents so I could fully understand the Court’s reasoning. However, I also think the Sixth Circuit proceedings will be rather interesting to follow in the months ahead for lender attorneys everywhere. I’ll share my thoughts about the decision in more detail in my next post.
